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1  . Preface 
FROM  THE 1950s  through  the  1970%  massive investments in  irrigation development  led to a 
substantial expansion in the area of irrigated agricultural land throughout the world. Without such 
an expansion in irrigated area and intensified production in existing irrigated lands, the green 
revolution could not have achieved the impact it had  on increasing the  world’s  food supply. 
However, the first wave of newly constructed irrigation was soon followed by repeated investments 
to rehabilitate  irrigation systems. These investments often had  to be  made much earlier than 
initially expected. This widespread failure in maintenance was often combined with maldistribu- 
tion of water within systems, leading to an absence of water reaching the lower portions of canals. 
Particularly in developing countries, governments have found it difficult to collect irrigation 
service fees when a large proportion of farmers are dissatisfied with the service. When governments 
fail to collect enough revenue to pay for the costs of routine operation and maintenance, irrigation 
systems deteriorate further, as does the service to the farmers. By the  1980%  it was clear that 
institutional reform was needed. 
Since the advent of the green revolution, the standard of living and literacy rates among rural 
populations in many developing countries have steadily increased, especially in Asia and Latin 
America.  By  the  1980s, debt burdens, inabilities of  governments to finance recurring  costs, 
growing  dissatisfaction  with  the performance  of  government  agencies in  natural  resource 
management and increased expectations about the capacity of local people to manage resources, 
have all combined to support various structural adjustment policies. What these policies generally 
have  in common is a desire to expand the role of  the private sector in the development  and 
management of natural resources. Presently, irrigation management transfer is perhaps the most 
prominent structural adjustment policy in the irrigation subsector. 
While it has been a policy of such countries as the United States and Taiwan for several decades 
to transfer management of government constructed irrigation systems to farmers, this is a relatively 
new policy in most developing countries, where it is largely driven by financial pressure. Since 
the 198Os, irrigation management transfer has become a national policy in such countries as Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Mexico in Latin America; the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh 
and Nepal in Asia; and Senegal, Niger, Nigeria and Madagascar in Africa. The transition to locally 
managed irrigation is fraught with many challenges and potential problems. Many countries are 
pressing ahead with transfer policies in situations where there are no clearly defined water rights 
for users, where irrigation works were not designed for local management, where systems have 
already deteriorated, where agriculture is declining in profitability, or where social conditions 
inhibit the formation of viable water users’ organizations. Management transfer is probably not a 
suitable policy in some circumstances. As with the green revolution, we might expect that if an 
essential package of  “management inputs” is not in place (however specified), the results of 
management transfer will not be acceptable or sustainable in the long run. It seems fair to assert 
that a policy is only worth as much as the feasibility of its implementation. 
Transfer  policy  has  the potential  for  fundamental  and  far-reaching  impacts  on  irrigated 
agriculture around the world. Therefore, it is imponant to attempt to define the following, through 
research and practice: What is the essential “management package” that is needed in order to make 
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the transfer policy successful and locally sustainable? What are  the necessary legal and institutional 
pre-conditions? What are the essential motivating conditions for farmers to corporately take over 
management of irrigation schemes? What kinds of support systems are needed to make locally 
managed  irrigation  viable? And, under  what circumstances is  a  management transfer  policy 
appropriate? 
This study of the 1969 management transfer in the Columbia River Basin in the United States 
is an important contribution toward answering questions about what elements are necessary to 
make a transfer policy  successful and sustainable. This case was selected as an example of a 
situation where arelatively complete set of preconditions existed for the transfer and where a rather 
successful result occurred. It is  one of the few existing studies which examines in detail the 
management context  within  which  transfer  occurred,  the process  itself,  and  the  impacts on 
management performance after transfer. The study makes numerous comparisons with situations 
in developing countries, pointing out both similarities and differences. The authors do not assert 
that developing countries should simply adopt policies and processes employed in the United 
States. The comparisons are meant to stimulate reflection about various aspects of management 
transfer which might need to  be more fully dealt with, in locally appropriate ways, in other settings. 
It is in this sense that the study has particular value, even for policymakers, implementers and 
observers in quite different contexts. We  hope that other case studies will be forthcoming which 
will, together, provide more comprehensive insights into what conditions are necessary to support 
viable locally managed irrigation. 
Jacob W.  Kijne 
Director for Research 
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CURRENTLY THEREIS keen interest in many developing countries in transferring responsibility for 
operating large publicly constructed irrigation systems to the farmer-beneficiaries of the systems. 
To understand the implications of such a shift on the performance of a system and the conditions 
under which such transfers can take place successfully, a case study was undertaken to document 
the causes and results of such a transfer. The Columbia Basin Project (CBP) in Washington State, 
USA was selected for this study. This selection was based on the facts that the United States has 
had a policy mandating transfer of managerial responsibility for publicly developed irrigation to 
users for almost 100 years, that good quality historical records describing system hydrology and 
financial performance were available, and that transfer in the CBP occurred more than 20 years 
ago, providing ample time for the post-transfer situation to stabilize and for longer-term problems 
to emerge. 
The CBP is a large multipurpose, reservoir-based project located on the Columbia River near 
the Canadian border. Construction of the dam was begun in  1933 and water first reached the 
command area in 1951. The current irrigated area is about 230,000 hectares (ha), while facilities 
for a roughly equal area included in the original plan have never been constructed. All water used 
by the irrigation system must be lifted 85 meters, from which point it is distributed to the command 
area largely by gravity flow. 
The national  irrigation  development  agency,  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Reclamation  (USBR), 
constructed the project and operated it from 1951 until 1969, when management was turned over 
to a set of three farmer-controlled irrigation districts. These districts had been established in 1939 
while construction was still underway and they had signed repayment contracts with the USBR 
obligating their members to reimburse the government for part of the cost of building the system. 
Each district today consists of 2,000 to 2,500 landowners and is controlled by a 5- to 7-person 
board elected from among them. The districts operate on a nonprofit basis and are required to cover 
their own operating costs. The districts purchase water from the USBR and then resell it to their 
members.  Payments  to the USBR  include an energy charge for basic  water lifting from  the 
reservoir, but the rate applied is highly subsidized. The USBR continues to operate some common 
facilities and retains formal ownership of all system facilities, though the right to operate and 
maintain them, and to collect revenue from the sale of irrigation service, rests with the districts. 
The districts require farmers to pay for basic water service in advance of the season or no water 
is delivered. The districts have the right to foreclose on farm property in the event of unpaid bills 
and have done this on a number of occasions. Water delivery to farms is on an arrangeddemand 
basis, and deliveries to individual farms are measured volumetrically for accounting and billing 
purposes. 
The negotiations between the USBR and the districts regarding the terms and conditions of the 
transfer were complex and occurred over the course of several years. Legal council was involved 
on  both  sides and political  influence was  sometimes used  by  the  districts. The results  were 
embodied in a set of three legally binding transfer agreements, which were in essence contracts 
between each district and the USBR. These agreements remain in force. 
xvii xviii  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the wake of the transfer in 1969,  the USBR levels fell dramatically, and the USBR assumed 
new roles as a wholesaler of water, an environmental regulator, and a water resource planner and 
manager. Many of the staff released by the USBR were subsequently reemployed by the districts, 
providing some operational continuity. However, the managers of the districts were selected from 
outside this personnel pool. 
The study made a concerted effort to document the hydrologic and financial results of  the 
transfer. In general, there appears to have been little or no effect on the quality of irrigation service 
received by farmers. Service was of high quality before the transfer and it remained so afterwards. 
However, conveyance efficiency in the main and branch canals of the three districts declined 
following the transfer and took 5 or 6 years to recover to previous levels. This is interpreted as a 
learning  period,  during  which  the  new  managers learned to operate  the  system  efficiently. 
Subsequently, a long steady decline in conveyance efficiency set in which continued to the end of 
thestudyperiodin 1989.Thisisthoughttobepartly  theresultofafailuretokeepup  withincreasing 
maintenance demands as the system ages. Even though system operation and management (08rM) 
expenditures held roughly constant, in real terms, before and after the transfer, an increasing 
number of maintenance problems were observed as time passed, suggesting that maintenance 
requirements  were accelerating. Also greater on-farm irrigation efficiencies  achieved by  the 
introduction of  sprinkler irrigation, with a limited ability to adjust at the main system level, 
probably contributed to the decline in conveyance efficiency. 
A sharp increase in the amount of water ordered from the USBR (but not delivered to farms) 
during  the  last three  years of  the  study  period  corresponds  with  the  installation  of 
hydropower-generating  equipment  in  larger system  canals  by  the  districts.  Because  power 
generation is a highly profitable undertaking for the districts, it is quite possible that this is a factor 
in the additional water ordered from the USBR. 
Following the transfer, the districts moved quickly to develop supplementary sources of income 
and to reduce operating expenses and water charges to thedistrict members. Supplementary income 
sources included investment income, power-generation revenues, and sales of water to non-district 
members. On average, water charges following the transfer were only 78 percent of their level 
during the USBR period, after adjusting for inflation. Real gross returns to irrigated agriculture 
have risen steadily in the CBP over the past 30 years with some indication that net returns have 
risen also. This trend appears unrelated to the management transfer. The fall in water-assessment 
levels as a result of the transfer, however, appears to have increased the net farm income by about 
15 percent. 
Overall, the transfer of management from the USBR to irrigation districts in the Columbia Basin 
Project can be considered a success. While the USBR was able to back out of its partly unwanted 
role in O&M, the districts gained local control over management and costs. This was an extended 
process, beginning in 1939,  13 years before water began flowing through the irrigation system, 
and culminating with the signing of the transfer agreements 30 years later. Analysis indicates that 
the project has not suffered significant negative impacts due to management transfer in the areas 
of quality of irrigation service to farmers, management efficiency, agricultural productivity, or 
farm profitability. At the same time, fhe  real level of water charges, on  both areal and volumetric 
bases, hasfallen substantially. The effect of the transfer on long-term sustainability of the system 
is less clear, and there is some indication that the physical system may be experiencing some net 
deterioration. 
A number of  lessons relevant to developing-country policymakers and implementers emerge 
from the analysis. These do not comprise a prescription for change, but are factors which should 
receive serious consideration in planning programs involving transfer of irrigation management 
responsibility to farmer-based groups. EXECUllVE SUMMARY  xix 
. 
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Put in place a clear and consistent policy mandating irrigation management transfer. 
Do not expect full cost recovery (capital and operational costs) in the first instance. 
Mandate financial autonomy for the new managing entity. 
Provide a strong legal basis for irrigators’ organizations. 
Provide a system of  secure and well-specified, long-term water rights. 
Invest to bring physical facilities up to standard. 
Create a fair and  accessible professional auditing system and mandate its use by 
managing organizations. 
Provide new employment or compensation for displaced irrigation agency staff. 
Involve farmers early on in the planning for the transfer. 
Empower fanners by giving them power and status to successfully negotiate with the 
public irrigation agency. 
Use contracts between irrigators’ groups and the managing agency to specify roles and 
responsibilities. 
Develop a locally appropriate water allocation system with volumetric measurement 
and payment at some level. 
Provide expertise or training in organization and management for farmers and farmer 
leaders. 
Provide assistance to operating agencies to improve management and human-relations 
skills, to enhance their ability to support farmers’ organizations. 
Specify an ongoing role for the operating agency in “partnership culture,’’ with the 
fanner-based organizations assuming management responsibility. CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
CURRENTLY THERE IS keen interest in many developing countries in transferring responsibility for 
operating large publicly constructed irrigation systems to the farmer-beneficiaries of the systems. 
The  reasons  for this  interest  vary from country  to country, but at its root  are the high and 
unrecovered cost of operating and maintaining large public irrigation systems and the perception 
that management can be made more efficient, effective, and sustainable by  involving farmers 
directly in the management of the schemes. 
while attracted  by  the promised  benefits, policymakers  and agency directors formulating 
irrigation policies are Concerned about the potential outcomes and wider impacts of such transfers, 
their institutional and financial sustainability, and the actions required of governments to facilitate 
the transfer process and to support and sustain the new managing organizations. Governments are 
also concerned with the fate of irrigation agency staff whose jobs are eliminated and with possible 
new roles for their irrigation agencies following the change. 
Efforts to  accomplish  this transition are underway  in  some developing  countries.  In the 
Philippines,  the  establishment  of  water  users'  associations  and  the  devolution  of  irrigation 
management responsibility and authority to farmers' groups have moved forward deliberately over 
a period of years with considerable success (Korten and Siy 1989). In the early 1980%  in Chile, 
ownership of irrigation systems was "privatized" to irrigators' associations and a national water 
law established saleable water rights (Bertranou and Schulze 1992). Other countries are pushing 
ahead rapidly  with transfer programs, sometimes with little appreciation of the complexities 
involved and with scant knowledge of the experience generated in other countries grappling with 
similar issues. 
Some turnover programs, such as  those in Indonesia, Nepal, Senegal and Bangladesh, focus on 
transferring management  responsibility for small-scale irrigation systems to fanners. Equally 
common are programs to transfer responsibility for managing tertiary and secondary levels of 
large-scale systems to farmers, such as  those in India, Nepal, the Philippines, China, and Sri Lanka. 
Other countries, such as Mexico, Colombia and Madagascar, have launched national programs to 
transfer management  responsibility  to water users'  associations and gradually  federate these 
associations upward-from field channel to distributary and, eventually, to main system levels 
(Vermillion 1992). 
Irrigation  management  transfer  or turnover  is related  to  a  broader  process  of  economic 
liberalization which has become a central feature of the development landscape over the past few 
years.  Although  applied  in  different  forms  in  different  countries,  economic  liberalization  is 
characterized by market-oriented economic policies, realistic exchange rates, liberalization of 
international trade, a central role for private enterprise in producing goods and services, reduction 
of  subsidies,  and transparency  in economic policy instruments, i.e.,  overt rather than  hidden 
subsidization and taxation (Svendsen and Rosegrant 1994). The purpose of  these reforms is to 
reduce the role of the government in the economy and allow the private sector to take over more 
of  the production of  goods and services. It is argued that this will  lead to greater efficiency, 
productivity and responsiveness to demand (Roth 1987). 2  CHAPTER 1 
The term privatization is sometimes used to describe the process of distancing productive 
activities from direct public control. Savas (1987) defines privatization as the act of reducing the 
role of the government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in the production of goods and 
services  or  in the  ownership of  productive  assets. Most  of  the  transfers  of  management 
responsibility mentioned above are subsumed by this definition. However, though privatization 
has often been relatively successful in more developed countries, it does not follow that it will be 
equally successful in less-developed countries which have not yet fully liberalized their economies 
nor  developed  a pool of  skilled local institutions in competition with  each other (Cook and 
Kirkpahick 1988,28). 
This case study was developed and implemented to document the transfer process for irrigation 
management and its impacts in a setting of strong institutions. The United States has had a policy 
mandating the transfer of managerial responsibility for publicly developed irrigation to users for 
almost 100 years. As a result, considerable experience with the precess is available. In addition, a 
relatively complete set of public and private-sector institutions supporting the management transfer 
process is present in the United States. This provides a setting in which the transfer process can be 
carefully docyented  ex post, and enabling conditions and institutions can be identified. 
The Columbia Basin Project (CBP) in Washington State, USA was selected as the case to be 
studied. The CBP is one of the larger schemes constructed and turned over to farmers in America. 
Because of the relatively large landholdings in the United States, it was felt desirable to examine 
the process in a large scheme where a relatively large number of farmers would be involved. Also, 
since management transfer in the CBP occurred in 1969,  sufficient time had elapsed for longer-term 
impacts to become evident, while the transfer process was still recent enough to be examined 
through interviews with participants. In addition, relatively good hydrologic and financial data 
were available for periods preceding and following the transfer, facilitating quantitative analysis 
of impacts. Although specific conditions may vary from scheme to scheme, the general issues and 
outcomes identified in the case study are felt to be broadly relevant to conditions in the western 
us. 
In discussing the study of the transfer process, Vemillion (1991) poses four bmad generic 
questions regarding management transfer. 1) What are the impacts of transfer on the hydrologic, 
agricultural,  and  economic  performance  of  irrigation  systems? 2)  What  key  legal,  policy, 
infrastructural,  and  institutional issues must be addressed to support successful management 
transfer? 3) What kinds of reorientation of agencies and farmers are needed to support turnover? 
4)  What  kinds  of  turnover  processes  and  self-management  models  work  best  in  different 
environments? 
The present study is undertaken to address these general questions where policy, institutional, 
and physicalconditions areexpected to haveled to asuccessful outcome. Itis intended todocument 
both the transfer process and its results and attempts to evaluate both in terms of their relevance 
to developing-country situations. In the text, passages with special relevance todeveloping-country 
situations are indented and italicized. The first three  questions listed are addressed most directly, 
but because the answer to the fourth question requires analysis across case studies, the study adds 
an important case to the set available for future analysis addressing this question as well. 
The study involved four visits to the site by  the authors and numerous visits by  a graduate 
student from the Washington State University engaged to help with data collection. Individual and 
group interviews were conducted with current and retired USBR staff, district managers and staff, 
farmers. lawyers representing both parties, and university researchers. Extensive use was also made 
of secondary data and historical records. Much of the insight gained relating to the impacts of the 
transfer resulted from analysis of extensive time-series data retrieved from the USBR files. A 
detailed description of the analytic approach employed in analyzing these data is given in Chapter 
5. Following the completion of the draft report, a one-day seminar was held with the USBR staff 
and the three irrigation district managers at the project site to review and interpret the study INTRODUCTION  3 
findings. This seminar provided a number of  very valuable insights which were important in 
preparing the find version of the paper.’ 
The  study report begins with a brief overview of the issues involved, lists the questions guiding 
the study, and provides a general description of the methodology employed. The second chapter 
describes  the features  of  the project  and  discusses its history  and  its physical  and  social 
environment. The third chapter reviews the two main institutions involved in the transfer-the 
USBR  and the three irrigation districts-and their relationship with each other. The fourth chapter 
describes the transfer process and the management changes which resulted from it. ?he fifth chapter 
comprises the main analytic exercise of the study and assesses the results of the transfer in terms 
of  changes in technology, quality of irrigation service, hydrologic efficiency, financial viability, 
profitability, and quality of maintenance. It contains an initial subsection detailing the methodology 
used in the analysis. The final chapter summarizes the results of the analysis and examines the 
factors enabling and facilitating successful transfer. It concludes with a discussion of  lessons 
learned for implementing such policies in developing countries. 
I  A telephone survey of a sample of fmnen in one district in the scheme is cumntly king  developed ?he survey is 
intended to provide additional informationon fanners’ water management practices  and their evaluation  of the irrigation 
service they receive. Results will be  reported sepamkly at a later date. CHAF’TER  2 
Columbia Basin Irrigation Project 
EARLY HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN THE BASIN’ 
EFFORTS  ATDEVELOPING irrigated agriculture in the Columbia Basin of Washington State go back 
to the previous century.  In  1898, the Great Northern Railway,  in  collaboration  with a local 
company, began to develop a small irrigation scheme nea.r  Ephrata, Washington,  the current 
headquarters of the Columbia Basin Project (CBP).  The venture failed before completing the 
project, as  did a successor company which took over construction. A third undertaking did finally 
complete the scheme in 1912, briefly bringing 1,200 acres (500 ha) of land under irrigation before 
failing six years later. 
Numerous  other  attempts  at irrigation development  were  made  by  companies,  private 
individuals, and  cooperatives  in  the early  years  of  this  century.  These  efforts  employed 
technologies ranging from gravity diversions to pumps powered by  gasoline engines, coal-fired 
steam plants, and even windmills. Many of these schemes set out to produce tree fruit, and most 
failed within a few years, victims of high pumping costs and fluctuating commodity prices, and 
sometimes outright chicanery? 
As experience with these early, largely unsuccessful experiments with private development 
began to accumulate, the public sector became moredirectly involved?Following  an  investigation, 
the Reclamation Service’ reported in 1903 that 1.5 to 2 million acres (600,000 to 800,000 ha) of 
land in the region could be brought under irrigation (Warne 1973). In 1907, the Quincy Valley 
Water Users’  Association6 was formed to attempt to involve the government in the irrigation 
development process. The association financed a feasibility study by a private consulting engineer 
which was promising enough to induce the establishment of the Quincy Valley Irrigation District 
in 1910. The new district proposed that the state of Washington be bonded for USWO million to 
irrigate 400,000 to 500,000 acres (160,000 to  200,000 ha) in the Quincy Valley, a proposition the 
state’s voters rejected in a referendum. 
2  This  discussion is based largdy on material cantaid  in the US. Depamnent of the Interior. Bureau of Reclamation 
(1578). 
3  Oncelaboratesckmeinitiatedin1909wassccurrdbyrnortgagestlLenourbyho~rsontheuland.Thcsckm 
went banLrupt in 1912. More than a million dollars and ow of th  pmmoters disappearrd and  the  body of mC other 
was pulled horn the Columbia River near the  site of thc pumphouse. 
According to thc  Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission (1971). 70 perccnt of the inigation development in thc 
region was initiated by individuals, mperatives. and agencics other than the Federal Governmnr although a major 
poltion of thc  irrigated ares  did receive some  f&  suppart 
The United States Reclamation Semice, fomnner to thc  Bureau of Reclamation. was established in 1902. 
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The idea for a dam on the Columbia at the Grand Coulee7 was first formally explored by Grant 
County, Washington in 1917-18. A deputy county engineer found a dam and irrigation scheme 
feasible but at a cost which would far exceed the means of the county. In 1919, the Washington 
State Legislature created the Columbia Basin Commission and appropriated US$lM),OOO to be 
used in studying this plan and a rival one calling for gravity flow diversion of water to the area 
from  the  Pend  Oreille Lake in  Idaho. The results  of  this  study  and  subsequent ones were 
contradictory and inconclusive. In 1926, the United States Congress appropriated US$600,wO for 
a new study, this one to be undertaken by  the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. This study was 
completed in 1931 and recommended a dam on the Columbia and the large-scale lifting of water 
for irrigation in the Columbia Basin.  Rejected by  President Hoover in  1932, the project  was 
approved by the newly elected President Franklin Roosevelt and was included in the new Public 
Works Administration Program the following year. The  first surveying stakes for the axis of the 
dam were driven on 9 September 1933. 
PROJECT CONSTRUCTION 
The centerpiece of the CBP is the Grand Coulee Dam. When constructed it was the largest concrete 
structure in the world, reaching 550 feet (191 meters [m]) from bedrock to crest and stretching just 
a few feet short of a mile across. The dam blocks the Columbia, the fourth largest river on  the 
North American Continent, forming the Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR)  Lake, areservoirextending 
151 miles (244 kilometers [km])  upstream to the Canadian border. The CBP was designed as a 
multipurpose project for irrigation, power generation, navigation, flood control, and stream flow 
regulation  (Infanger  1974), with  recreation and  wildlife conservation becoming increasingly 
important objectives in later years. 
With the outbreak of  World War 11,  power generation received first priority in the ongoing 
construction work, and the construction of the irrigation components of the project was temporarily 
suspended. The  18 main  108,OOO  kilowatt generators called for in the original design  were 
commissioned between 1941 and 1951. Construction work on the irrigation portion of the project 
resumed in 1947 following the war, and in 1951, the fust test water flowed toward the Columbia 
Basin farmland (USDI 1978). Over the next 16 years the area irrigated by the project increased 
steadily at a rate of about 25,000 acres (10,000 ha) per year, reaching a total of 448.000 acres 
(181,000 ha) in 1967 (Figure 1). Since then growth has continued, but at a much slower pace, and 
in 1989, the project irrigated approximately 570,000 acres (231,000 ha). 
As of 1986, US$1.687 billion had been spent on construction of the Columbia Basin Project, 
including the dam, irrigation facilities, and the 6,500-megawatt Grand Coulee hydroelectric power 
plant complex. Eighty-eight percent of the total construction cost is being paid for by  power 
revenues, with interest, while 12 percent is being repaid by irrigation fees, without interest. 
7  A coulee is a deep ravine or valley, and the Grand Coulee is an extremely long and deep coulee fomd  by  waters of 
the Columbia during the ice age wkn  an ice dnm  blocked  the present course of the river. Figure 1.  Area im'gated (acres), the CBe 1953-89. 
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Source: Water Distribution Repom for  the CBP.  U.S. Bureau of Reclamatioo 8  CHAPTER 2 
The project was originally designed to serve 1,095,000 acres (443,000 ha) within the "Big 
Bend" of the Columbia (Map I). However, the higher and more rolling lands on the eastern side 
of the proposed project area benefited from a somewhat higher rainfall than other parts of the 
project area and settlers there were successfully  engaged  in raising  extensive tracts of wheat 
following the war. They objected to the small size of the farms they would be able to retain once 
the  land  was  irrigated,  as  stipulated  in  the  project  legislation. About  three-quarters of  the 
wheatlands in the East Irrigation District was withheld by the owners before construction began 
(Warne 1973). Consequently, the East High Canal, which was to serve this area, was never built. 
Ii is imporrant to nofe  that farmers here had rhe collecrive oprion fo refuse rhe 
project.  This is unlike  the situation  in many developing  countries,  where 
serrlement and irrigation projects are open idenrijied and implemented wiihout 
seeking prior farmer agreemenr or requiring any repayment. The requiremenr 
of a formal agreement M  doubt helped engender a sense of commifmeni  ro the 
project among farmers who didfinally accepr the terms of  consiruciion and 
transfer. 
Map 1. Location map: The Columbia Basin Project. 
CANADA 
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POWER GENERATION 
When the last of  the 18 main generators in the left and right powerhouses at the Grand Coulee 
went into service in 195 1, it was the largest hydroelectric facility in the western hemisphere (USDI 
1978). In  1975, a third powerhouse was dedicated and, when it became fully operational in the COLUMBIA  BASIN IRRIGATION PROIEJ3  9 
early eighties, the installed capacity of the Grand Coulee power complex stood at an awesome 
6,494 megawatts. Current operating rules call for the use of the Grand Coulee to provide peaking 
power to meet morning and evening periods of maximum demand. In a typical year. the power 
complex at the dam produces about 20 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, which is marketed and 
distributed by the Bonneville Power Administration, a separate public agency. Power generation 
provides by far the largest share of  the economic benefits resulting from the project. 
Water allocated to irrigation does not contribute to this power generation as it is withdrawn 
from the reservoir and lifted 280 feet (85 m) to the top of the escarpment bordering the reservoir 
without passing through the turbines to the river below. This means that there is little direct 
competition between the timing of releases for power generation and for irrigation demands, as 
the  two  operate largely  independently.  Some of  the potential energy  contained  in  the lifted 
irrigation water is recovered subsequently through smaller generation facilities located within the 
project area. On a daily basis, the presence of a reregulating reservoir downstream of  the pumps 
allows pumping to be timed so as not to coincide with peak power demand elsewhere in the grid. 
Seasonally, the greatest power demand is experienced in winter (December to March) when no 
irrigation is being practiced. We will see below that the hydroelectric component has beem  an 
important asset to the financial viability of the CBP. especially since it does not significantly 
compete with irrigation water supply. 
PROJECT PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Location 
The CBP lies in the east central portion of Washington State, in the United States of America, at 
about 47 degrees north latitude (Map 1).  The city of  Spokane lies  120 miles (195 km) to the 
northeast and Seattle 160 miles (260 km) to the west. The area is well-served by  road and rail 
systems. The elevation of  the command area varies from 1,400 feet (430 m) in the upper end of 
the scheme to about 500 feet (150 m) in the lower end. The service area begins 45 miles (75 km) 
south and  slightly west of  the Grand Coulee Dam, spanning about 80 miles (130 km) in a 
northkouth direction and roughly 50 miles (80 km) east to west (Map 2). About half of this area 
is classed as irrigable, the remainder being rough and unsuitable for imgation. Irrigated areas are 
thus separated by uncultivated lands and spread out over a large area. A number of small towns 
exist within the boundaries of the project, many of  which have grown considerably since the 
creation of  the system. Three larger cities, Pasco, Richland, and Kennewick, are located at the 
extreme southern end of  the command, near the confluence of the Columbia and Snake rivers. 
Climate 
The climate in the Columbia Basin is an arid continental type; hot in summer, cold in winter, and 
extremely dry. The warmest month, August, has an average maximum temperature of  86.4 OF, 
(30.2 "C) and an average minimum temperature of  52.6 "F,  (1 1.4 "C), while the coldest month, 
December, has an average daily minimum temperature of 23.6 OF  (-4.7 "C) and a maximum  of 
37.6'F  (3.1 "C). Average monthly maximum and minimum temperatures are shown in Table 1. 10 
Map 2. The Columbia Basin Project. 
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Table I.  Average monthly remperatures, rainfall andpotenrial evapotranrpirafion rares for rhe CBP. 





Bold type denotes the cropping season, which runs from March through October. 
Maximum and minimum temperature figures  are based on an average of 5 years of daily temperature 
data (1980-1984) from the Washington State University Experiment Station at Rosser, near Pasco, 
Washington. 
Precipitation figures are based on an 8-year average (1981-1988) of data collected by the USBR at the 
OSullivan Dam (the Potholes Reservoir) located in the center of the project area. 
Potential Evapotranspiration  (PET) is based on estimated incoming solar radiation and average monthly 
temperature, after Hargreaves and Samani (1986). 
Located in the rain shadow of the Cascade Mountains, precipitation ranges from 6 inches (150 
millimeters [mm]) in the southwestern part of the service area to around 10 inches (250 nun) in 
the northeastern highlands. Average monthly precipitation data for the center of the command area 
are shown in Table 1. It is noted that the amount of rainfall received during the irrigation season, 
which extends from March to October, is extremely small, comprising 3.65 inches (93 mm) or 56 
percent of the annual total. Minimum values for the year are recorded for the months of July and 
August-the heart of the growing season-when temperatures are at their peak. 
Potential evapotranspiration (PET),  by contrast, totals 37.09 inches (942 nun) for the year, with 
93 percent of the annual total occumng during the March to October period. The result is that 
rainfall supplies  just 9.3 percent of the growing-season PET requirement in the Columbia Basin, 
and only 2 or 3 percent of the requirement during the peak demand months of July and August. 
Rainfall is thus a fairly minor factor in meeting crop water requirements. 
Relief 
As noted above, the project area drops 900 feet (275 m) from the upper end to the lower, a fall of 
about  I1 feet per mile (2.1 m per km), or an average slope of about 0.2  percent. This relatively 
large gradient has several implications for the design and operation of the system. First, it allowed 
the easy inclusion of free-flowing water measurement structures in the design, as the head loss 
they cause did not create design difficulties. Second, it provides ample opportunity for reusing 
drainage water. In fact, the southernmost district of  the three making up the system is supplied 
largely by recaptured drainage water from the two higher elevation districts. Third, it results in the 
need  for drop structures in the major canals, providing opportunity for profitable small-scale 
hydropower generation within the project. 12  CHAPTER  2 
Soils 
Soil composition in the basin varies widely from deep, fine. windblown materials with moderately 
low clay content to shallow, sandy wind-deposited soils. Long periods of semiaridity resulted in 
the formation of a very hard calcium carbonate-sulfate caliche deposit in most subsoils. These are 
usually covered by  18 inches to 15 feet of fertile soil. These soils are generally easily worked and 
low in alkali and other injurious chemicals (USDI 1978). 
Soils in the project area were categorized as irrigable and nonirrigable during the project 
planningphase. Theirrigablesoils were thendivided intofourclassesdepending  on their suitability 
for agricultural production. Class 1 land is smooth, gently sloping, deep, and fertile, adaptable to 
a wide range of crops and free of alkali and rocks. Class 2 is average land, good for farming, but 
not as good as Class 1. Class 3 includes land which can be farmed under irrigation, but is limited 
in the kind of crops it would grow and is expected to give poorer yields than the other lands. Class 
4, because of its rolling topography and low water-holding capacity, is suitable only for sprinkler 
irrigation. 
The distribution of land in various classes across the three districts is shown in Table 2. The 
East District has the largest share of its land in the preferred classes 1 and 2 (69%), followed by 
the Quincy District at 59 percent, and the South District at 49 percent. Less than 7 percent of project 
land is in Class 4, suitable only for sprinkler irrigation, most of which is in the South District where 
it makes up about 10 percent of the irrigated area. 
Table 2. Irrigated land classes in the CBP (land area given in acres). 
Source:  US.  Bureau of Reclamation data. 
Rural Infrastructure 
Prior to the fust irrigation delivery, there was a coordinated and rapid development of hard-sur- 
faced roads, electricity, telephones, and schools throughout the project area. Electricity remains 
relatively inexpensive (about  17 mills'  per KWH). The project is  served by  an excellent road 
network and numerous truck  lines, railways, and airlines. Farm products can also be loaded directly 
onto ocean-going barges on the Columbia River in Pasco, at the southern end of the project area. 
The availability of hydroelectric power from the Grand Coulee facilitated rapid industrialization 
and population growth in the Northwest Region, and an expanding regional food market. Several 
thousand people are employed today in agricultural processing plants within the contiguous area 
of the CBP. 
8  A mill is equal UI OM-Ienlh  of  a U.  S.  cent, or ow-thousandth of a dollar. COLUMBIA BASIN IRRIGATION PROJF,CT  13 
IRRIGATION WATER SUPPLY, DELIVERY AND APPLICATION 
Project Water Right and Withdrawals 
The granting of water rights in the United States is a state responsibility. Under Washington state 
law, once a withdrawal permit is granted, individuals have 3 years, and the Federal Government 
has 10 years, to put the water to beneficial use. Extensions to this period can be granted. When the 
project is developed, a certificate is issued specifying three characteristics of  the right. These are 
the rate at which water can be withdrawn, the total volume  of water which can be withdrawn in a 
given year, and the area of land which can be supplied from the right. Permits and certificates 
conferring rights for the CBP are issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology and are 
held by the USBR. 
The original permit granted for the CBP in 1938 was for 13,450 cfs with an annual withdrawal 
volume of 2.910  million acre-feet to irrigate 590.000 acres. A certificate for this right was issued 
to the USBR  in December  1988. A  small additional right for withdrawal of  1,140 cfs and a 
maximum annual withdrawal of 214.000 acre-feet to irrigate 50.000 acres was certified in 1991 
for a newly developed portion of the scheme? 
Since 1985 when imgated area stabilized at around 560,000 acres (227,000 ha), withdrawals 
have been running about 2.6 million acre-feet (3.2 billion cubic meters) annually, just under the 
quantity allowed by the certificate of right. These withdrawals comprise just 3.3 percent of the 80 
million acre-feet of water which flows down the Columbia past this point each year and require 
about 4 percent of the dam’s annual power production. 
Water rights are extended to the irrigation districts through repayment contracts between the 
USBR and the districts. Fanners are linked to these rights at the district level through membership 
in the district and through ownership of land in the district service area, as recorded on land plats. 
Project water rights are translated into “basic water allotments” at the farm level, specified as 
volume  of  water per unit area. The size of  this  basic  water allotment  depends on  the land 
classification category  as described under “Soils” above. Class  1 land (the best) is allowed 3 
acre-feet per acre per year, Class 2 land, 3.5 acre-feet per acre, and Class 3 land, 4 acre-feet per 
acre. Farmers may order an extra 0.5 acre-feet per acre “supplemental allotment,” if they wish, at 
the same unit charge as the basic allotment. At a higher charge, fanners may order “excess water” 
deliveries over their base and supplemental allotments. Fanners with holdings in different crops 
or  land  in  different  locations  often combine their basic  water  allotments  and reallocate  the 
aggregate basic allotment flexibly on their various fields. Only the basic charge applies to all water 
used as long as the total used does not exceed the farmer’s aggregate basic allotment. Hence, water 
allotments are transferable among fields within the farm of a single owner, even if the fields are 
not contiguous, hut not among farms and different owners. 
System Physical Facilities 
The irrigation system serving the CBP can be divided into a supply system, a conveyance and 
delivery system, and, at the fann level, a distribution and application system. Each component has 
both physical and management components. A brief  description of  project physical works is 
provided below. Water management practices are described in a subsequent section. 
9  Rights granted are far “‘beneficial  use” and the certificate stipulates that the  smtc may refuse  to allow the appropriator 
to use water where ”willful neglect to use water in an efficient manner” is demonsualed. In practice,  this provision is 
difficult lo apply. 14  CHAPTER 2 
The supply system comprises the Grand Coulee Dam and the FDR Lake behind it (Map 2 
[p.lO]). The lake stores some 9.562 million acre-feet (1 1.790 billion cubic meters) of water, with 
5.232 million acre-feet (6.45  1 billion cubic meters) of this stored water available for use. The dam 
is operated by  the USBR. 
Twelve large pumps lift water 280 feet (85 m) to the top of the escarpment bordering the river 
channel. Six of these were included in the original design and are rated at 65,000 horsepower and 
lift 1,600 cubic feet of water per second (cfs). The remaining six are pumpback units which, rated 
at 67,500 horsepower and 1,750 cfs, were added at the time of the construction of the third power 
plant in the 1970s. They can function either as pumps or, if water is allowed to flow hack down 
through  them from above, as generators supplying power to the Northwest Power Pool. The 
intention was to use them to lift water into an upper reservoir during periods of low power demand 
and then to generate power with that same water during peak demand periods. Today, because the 
entire Grand Coulee complex is used as a peaking facility, the pumpback units are typically used 
only as pumps. Pumps are operated in various combinations depending on head conditions, relative 
efficiencies, and maintenance schedules.1° 
The conveyance and delivery system comprises a number of components. Water lifted by the 
pumps empties into a short (1.6 mile) feeder canal which supplies a second reservoir (the Banks 
Lake), formed by damming both ends of the Grand Coulee. The Banks Lake has a storage capacity 
that is small relative to that of the FDR Lake, but at 1.3 million acre-feet (1.6 billion cubic meters) 
total  storage, and 0.715 million  acre-feet (0.9 billion  cubic  meters) active  storage. it  is still 
significant. It serves as an equalizing reservoir, allowing the main pumps to operate whenever the 
system power demand is lowest while permitting continuous operation of  the irrigation system 
beyond. 
Various civil works, including a major two-bore syphon and tunnel. then lead water some 21 
miles to a bifurcation point where the main canal divides into the 88-mile long West Canal, serving 
the Quincy Irrigation District, and the 87-mile East Low Canal, which serves principally the East 
Irrigation District. About 34 miles of each canal are lined with either concrete or clay. Along the 
main canal, water drops 165 feet, at one point, into a small lake that forms a part of the main 
conveyancesystem. Originally, water was allowedto fall from this heightovera basalt cliff.  Today, 
this energy is recaptured as hydroelectric power in a 92-megawatt facility developed jointly by the 
irrigation districts in 1985. With the exception of this generating facility, the system to this point 
is  operated  by  the  USBR.  Below  the  bifurcation,  the respective  irrigation  districts  assume 
responsibility.  The  districts handle both distribution of  water to individual farmers from their 
primary canals and a network of branch canals and laterals totaling 2,026 miles (3,268 km) in 
length, across all three districts. 
Located in the center of the project area is a 5 11.700 acre-foot reservoir’’ formed by a 3.5-mile 
long earthfill dam. This dam captures some natural drainage, but its principal source of water is 
return flow and drainage water from the surrounding irrigated area, which comprise most of the 
annual withdrawals from the reservoir. “Natural”  inflows can also be supplemented by direct 
diversions of project water from the East Low Canal if needed. The third district in the CBP, the 
South Irrigation District, receives its water supply from this reservoir. 
10  Thesixoriginal pumps are  coupleddirectly,inp;urs.  to singlegenerators intheleftpwerplmt.  The six newerpumpback 
units corn off of the line a1 the Gmd  Coulee substation md. in effect. are powered by the entire grid. 
I 1  Active storage is 132.203 acre-fret (409.8  million cubic meters). COLUMBIA BASIN IRRIGATION PROJECT  15 
In addition to gravity distribution from the Banks Lake, some project water is relifted once or 
even twice to reach higher-lying lands. For this purpose, the districts operate 240 pumping plants 
across the project. 
Water is measuredextensively throughout the project area. Measurementtakesplaceat all major 
inflow and bifurcation points, at major wasteways. and at all 7.000 turnouts in the project area. 
Structures used for making measurements range from rated sections of larger canals to v-notch 
weirs and double-gated turnouts at the farm level. 
The ability to measure and record waterflows ar such a large number ofpoints 
is a significant feature of the water allocation and charging system employed 
in  the  CBP. However, it  is not  a generic  requirement for effecrive fanner 
management, as many thousands of indigenous  farmer-managedsystems in Asia 
will aftesr.  The general inability 10  memure volumetric deliveries to  farmers in 
developing  countries does make a demand system of water delivery, coupled 
with quasi-volumetric pricing  at the  level of the individual farm, diflicult to 
implement. Modr$ications to this allocational system to apply to groups of users 
would usually be necessary. 
Once water is delivered to the farm turnout, it is typically carried in an earthen channel to a 
sump where it is pumped into a sprinkler system or led to furrows for surface application. When 
the project first began operation, most water application was done using furrows or corrugations 
or simply by wild flooding. In 1959, the first year for which data are available, about three-quarters 
of the system’s irrigated area was surface-irrigated. By  1989, two-thirds of the area was under 
sprinkler irrigation and only one-third remained surface-irrigated. Growth in sprinkler irrigation 
over this 30-year period has been continuous but more rapid at some times than at others (Figure 
2). In particular, the period between 1972 and  1977 was one of  especially rapid growth, with 
sprinkler irrigated area expanding at a compound annual rate of 7.1 percent. Since 1977, however, 
sprinkler irrigated area has grown at only 1.5 percent per year. The overall rate of growth for the 
30-year period was 5.6 percent. 
In recent years, farmers have shown a strong preference for center pivot systems, locally called 
“circles,” over other types of  moveable sprinkler systems. Earlier, wheel roll systems were far 
more common than they  are now. According to one irrigation equipment dealer in  Othello, 
headquarters of the East Irrigation District, his dealership now installs 60 to 70 new center pivot 
systems for every wheel system sold. According to a senior USBR engineer, new  wheel roll 
systems are purchased mainly to replace existing ones, but not to irrigate new land. Most new 
center pivots are designed to operate in a quarter-section of land, 160 acres (65 ha), though the 
circle they inscribe covers only about 137 acres. ?heir attractiveness is largely due to their lower 
labor costs. Orchards are mainly irrigated with solid set systems. 
Surface irrigation remains the primary method of irrigating some crops, such as corn. It was 
also used to irrigate sugar beets, though this crop has now disappeared from the basin. Most surface 
irrigation relies on syphon tubes to bring water out of a channel and onto the field, where it flows 
into furrows or corrugations. Gated pipe is also used for the same purpose and there is some 
cablegation-an automated system for opening and closing the openings in a distribution pipe. 
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As  Figure 2  shows,  there  are sharp differences  in  the adoption  of  sprinkler  application 
technology among the three districts. The South District was the earliest to employ sprinklers 
extensively and, today, it is nearly completely sprinkler irrigated. This can be accounted for by fhe 
rougher terrain found  there  and  its light, extremely  erosive soils.12 The slowest adoption  of 
sprinklers has been in the East District. The slopes there are flatter and soils heavier, making fmow 
irrigation more feasible. In addition, the variety ofcrops grown is more limited, with fewer orchard, 
vineyard, and seed crops. This may, in part, be aresult of the  limited area under sprinkler irrigation 
as well as a cause for continued reliance on surface irrigation techniques. 
The Quincy District is intermediate in sprinkler adoption. Sprinkler irrigated area in the district 
which was around 23 percent in 1959,  has grown to around 63 percent in 1989.  Initial growth in 
Quincy was much slower than in the South District, but since 1972,  it hasfzccelerated  and continues 
to grow rapidly. Sprinklers here are said to be particularly concentrated in the Royal Slope area in 
the southern part of the district where soils are lighter and slopes steeper. 
The project also contains 1,221  miles (1,965  km)  of open drains and several thousand miles of 
buried pipe drains, with additional tile drainage being installed each year by the USBR. Although 
internal soil drainage is generally god,  intensive irrigation has caused waterlogging problems in 
someareas. Asof September 1991,115,970acresofprojectland  weredrained,aboutthreequarters 
of the estimated 153,140 acres requiring anificial drainage. 
Water Management Procedures 
The basic water management procedures used by the USBR have, with some adjustments, been 
continued by the districts after management transfer. The scheduling process used in the project 
is referred to by engineers interviewed as a “modified demand ~ystem.”’~  Deliveries are based on 
requests from users, subject to scheduling and supply constraints. Crop water requirements are not 
calculated by  the districts, but individual farmers may base their water requests on their own 
scheduling calculations, those of a commercial irrigation scheduling service, or their own experi- 
ence. Fanners may request deliveries up to the limit of their basic and supplemental allotments at 
the normal charging rate. Farmers may also order additional “excess” water at a higher rate. Excess 
water orders are limited by  the system conveyance capacity and by drainage capacity. If the use 
of excessive amounts of water causes drainage problems for field neighbors, the district may restrict 
the quantity of excess water a farmer may order. 
To order water, a fanner leaves a four-by-five inch water request card at his turnout (often kept 
in a lidded fruit jar). This has information on the delivery rate, start time, and duration of the water 
order. The card must be posted at the turnout by the time the ditchrider normally passes by or else 
the farmer must telephone the watermaster’s office with an order by 3:OO P.M., in order to have an 
order filled the next day. If the order is called in by telephone, the fanner is expected to submit a 
signed card the following day. The cards are used for scheduling water deliveries and for billing. 
Ditchriders report all orders to the watermaster by 4:OO  P.M. each day and the watermaster “calls 
in” with the orders to the district office immediately thereafter. By 4:30 P.M. the district office calls 
the USBR project offce  and the project adjusts the gates in the main system so that adequate water 
will be available on the following day to fill orders. Main system gates are adjusted remotely by 
a “Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition”  system, which is a computer-centered  system 
12  A b&  in a lateral on a hillside here can  quickly cmde a gully 15 to 20 feel  deep. The soil’s comistency is mat of 
13  ‘Ihis  system is sometimes called an  arranged  demand  syslem in thc  irrigation literam. 
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involving automatic stage  recorders, radio telemetry and remote gate-control devices. The morning 
following receipt of new delivery orders, ditchriders adjust lateral gates and turnouts to make their 
deliveries. There are roughly  100 to 120 farm turnouts per ditchrider, which must be inspected 
daily, and 5 to 10 ditchriders per watermaster, depending on the distance which must be traveled. 
Watermaster sections are roughly 50,000 to 60,000 acres (20,000 to 24,000 ha) in extent. 
Maintenance work is now planned and executed by the districts and reported to the USBR. 
Although general maintenance schedules are available, detailed O&M manuals are not used by the 
USBR or the districts. It is felt by both the USBR  and the district engineers interviewed that 
manuals were largely unnecessary, because “too many problems are unique” and because the level 
of skills and experience of the operations staff make them unnecessary. Field operational activities 
are fast-paced, and district managers argue that ditchriders simply do not have time to consult 
operations  manuals.  New  staff  are trained  on  an  apprenticeship  basis  working  with  senior 
watermasters and ditchriders. 
This may seem somewhat ironic to engineers in developing countries who often 
face donors who require the production of O&M manuals for most large-scale 
projecrs.  Such  manuals are offen little  used  after  they  are produced.  The 
experience of the CBP suggests that perhaps more emphasis should be placed 
on skill development and in-the-field training than on manual development. 
No water is delivered to a farmer for a new cultivation season until he pays the base water charge 
to his district. Supplemental and extra water charges may be paid during the season but must be 
paid off prior to the following irrigation season. Fees are charged by the acre (not by the acre-foot) 
sofarmerspaythesamebaserateregardlessofthelandclass,  thoughtheyreceivedifferentamounts 
of water as their base allotment. Monthly water and financial statements for each farm are kept by 
the district. 
The  modified demand system used by irrigation districts in the CBP  has three key aspects which 
work  together  to provide  effective  management control. First,  water rights  are defined 
volumetrically. Second, water delivery is measured  down to the user level. Third, basic water 
allocations to the user must be paid in advance of deliveries. If payment is not made, water delivery 
can be, and is, prevented. 
These three conditions  normally  do not exist in developing  countries  and  are difficult  to 
implement because of the small holding sizes and the high resulting transaction costs. In some 
places in developing countries however, such as in the Kakrapar Left Bank Canal, Gujarat, India, 
water can be measured and sold volumetrically at a canal or group level (Datye and Patil 1987). 
PROJECT SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Settlement Patterns and Policies 
In the 1920s, just prior to the construction of the Grand Coulee Dam. 90 percent of the land in the 
Columbia Basin was privately owned by early settlers and homesteaders. Most of the farmland 
was used for dryland wheat production.  Severe droughts and economic depression prior to the 
project often left large tracts of farmland fallow, and, after several years, such land reverted to 
sagebrush. 
As construction of the Grand Coulee Dam began  in  1933, numerous studies, termed “Joint 
Investigations,” were conducted which led to the enactment of land tenure laws and regulations 
aimed at providing opportunities “for the maimurn number of small farms to support families’’ 
(Wame 1973, 135). Reflecting this social welfarepolicy concern, the Anti-Speculation Act of 1937 COLUMBIA BASIN IRRIGATION PROJECT  19 
was passed to limit farm sizes to 40 acres (16.1 ha). However, this provision was supplanted hy 
the Columbia Basin Act of  1943 which permitted “farm units” to vary from 10 to 160 acres (4.0 
to 64.7 ha), depending on land quality and topography. The sizes were based on an estimation of 
the landholding’s potential to provide a “suitable level of  living” for an “average family” of two 
parents and two children. The law required all land to he appraised at dryland value. Landowners 
having more than the amount permitted were required to sell their “excess” land at the dryland 
rate before any water could be delivered  to them to prevent  windfall profits from accruing to 
existing landowners (Doka 1979,74-75). 
The original goals of the  CBP were similar to those of  many settlement and 
irrigation projects in developing countries-to provide a modest livelihood to 
a large number of small  farmers. Restrictions which attempt toprevent the value 
of irrigation works developed largely at public expense from being capitalized 
into land values for the favored, should generally be a standard part of  new 
project developmentplans. However, they have proved dificult to enforce, both 
in developing countries and in the  United States, and in the CBP they proved 
only partially erective. 
Subsequently, the settlement goals of the project shifted toward providing fewer hut more 
productive farms and offering settlement opportunities for veterans after World War 11. Preferences 
for veterans expired in 1960. New settlers in the project area bought approximately 90 percent of 
their irrigable land from existing private owners and the rest from the Federal Government (Doka 
1979, 106). By the 1960%  the rising pressures from farmers seeking greater economic opportunity, 
commercialization of farms, and the increasing use of labor-saving technologies created pressures 
to increase again the allowable size of farms Wane  1973). In  1962, Conpress revised the 1943 
Act to allow a husband and wife to own 320 acres (129.5 ha) of land, while allowing an individual 
owner a 160-acre (64.7-ha) farm. 
In contrast to the Anti-Speculation Act of 1937, the Acts of 1943 and 1962 emerged out of an 
interest in profitability for the farmer. Following the passage of the 1962 Act, the price of irrigated 
land increased markedly. From a base of 100 in the 1958-62  period, land values  jumped to an index 
value of 156 in the period 1963-65 (Wame 1973,133).  Through this period, politicians were quite 
responsive to pressures from the farmers and the districts actively lobbied for this and other causes. 
The  Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 again raised the allowable irrigated farm size. It allowed 
a husband and wife or a corporation with less than 25 shareholders to receive subsidized irrigation 
water for a farm of up to 960 acres (388.5 ha) of Class 1 land, or its productive equivalent on lower 
class land. According to USBR sources, only 2 percent of  the farmers exceeds this limitation and 
pays the unsubsidized  rate, though these 2 percent controls 7 percent of the land in the project. 
Farmers complain however, about the heavy burden of paperwork required by the new act for all 
farmers operating units larger than 40 acres. The act gives the USBR the right to refuse water to 
farmers not complying with its reporting requirements. Farmers indicate, however, that the system 
is ineffective in enforcing the new regulations. 
The effect of the policy changes has been to revise the equity orientation of the project, which 
intended to provide an “adequate living” to a maximum number of  small farmers, to one of 
providing greater economic opportunity to a smaller number of larger-scale farmers. This shift is 
both the result of political pressures exerted by farmers and the economic specialization which 
occurred after World War I1 (Warne 1973, 136). 
In  contrast  to the situation, common  in developing countries, of  increasingly  fragmented 
landholdings, farm sizes in the Columbia Basin have increased over time. In 1948, 80  new farm 
units were created from 5,790 acres, for an average of 72.4 acres (29.3 ha) per farm. Twenty-eight 
years later, in 1976, 79 new farm units were created from 11,065 acres, for an average of  140.1 20  CHAPTER 2 
acres (56.7 ha) per farm (Doka 1979, 103). In  1958,50 percent of the total irrigable acreage (74 
percent of the farms) of the CBP was in farm units less than 160 acres in size. In 1973, only 24 
percent of the total irrigable area (52 percent of the farms) was in farm units in this category, the 
remainder being larger (Doka 1979, 104). 
In addition, the number of farm units worked by a single operator has increased steadily over 
time. USBR data show that, in 1960, the average full-time operator worked 2.26 farm units, while 
by  1989, the average had increased by a quarter to 2.89 units. Average farm sizes today are in the 
range of 160 to 240 acres (64.7 to 97 ha). Owners operate roughly 60 percent of farm units while 
renters operate 40 percent. At the same time, there has been a sharp increase in the number of 
landowners in the 160-acre-or-less class. Most of these landowners have holdings of one acre or 
less, which suggests that growth in this category is a result of subdivision for residential and other 
nonagricultural purposes. 
Several factors are responsible for the growth in  unit sizes of  working farms. Expanding 
off-farm  employment  opportunities have drawn  some families out of  agriculture altogether, 
making farms available for sale to other farmers. In addition, agricultural mechanization, scale 
requirements of economic viability, relaxed legal restrictions on farm size, and the extension of 
the project into less-favorable land which required larger holdings to be economically viable have 
all played a role. Farmers have also expanded farm units beyond legal limits, using various means 
to consolidate farms and distribute ownership to avoid land-ceiling restrictions. 
As a result of the expansion in farm sizes, population density in the irrigated area of the project 
in the 1970s, at 152 persons per 1,030 acres, was less than half of pre-project projections of 350 
to 400 per 1,OOO  acres. In 1952, the on-farm population was only 1,060. By  1960, it had grown to 
8,414, after which it peaked at 12,066 in 1970 and declined slightly during the 1970s. 
According to USBR data, there were 7,928 landholders registered in the three irrigation districts 
of the project in 1990 1.979 in the East District, 2,548 in the Quincy District, and 3,401 in the 
South District. Of all landholders, 70 percent has less than 160 acres of irrigated land in the project. 
Only 7 percent has 640 acres or more. Not all of these landholders are farmers, however. Although 
accurate records are lacking, local informants estimate that there are roughly 2,500 farmers on the 
project today. 
Study informants reported that there are numerous cases where  fanners exceed 
farm-size limits by various means such as registering holdings in the names of 
relatives.  This makes  it  difficult  to specify  exactly  what  the  land  tenure 
distribution is and  how my  farmers there are in  the area. Such regulatory 
weaknesses are clearly not limited to developing countries. 
Characteristics of Settlers 
According to a study conducted in 1956, early in the settlement process, the “average” Columbia 
Basin farmer was about 40 years old and married, with two or three children. The man and wife 
had an average of  12.3 years of schooling, compared with the national average of the time for 
farmers of 8.6 years. About half were military veterans. Twenty-five percent of the farmers had 
attended college. About 20 percent had been in farm training programs. Ninety-four percent of the 
men and 60 percent of the women were raised on farms, and only  1 percent had no prior farm 
experience. The proportion of highly skilled farmers, i.e., those with postgraduate, professional or 
managerial training, was well above the national average for farmers (USBR 1978.32-33). Settlers 
arrived in the project with average assets of about US$24,OOO (Wame 1973,134). In short, settlers 
in the Columbia Basin Project were well-educated, experienced in farming, above average in 
wealth, and commercially oriented. They were farmers by choice in a booming postwar economy, COLUMBIA BASIN IRRIGATION PROJECT  21 
a far cry from the 1930’s conception of masses of poor “buckboard pioneers” who would rush in 
to settle in project lands. 
Despite their typical independence, Columbia Basin farmers are accustomed to being involved 
in  a variety  of social institutions, such  as soil and water conservation districts, weed control 
districts, volunteer fire departments, 4-H Clubs,  l4 church groups, and civic associations of various 
sorts. Local  government  units and  county  planning  commissions  developed  rapidly  during 
settlement. Among farm families, there was a strong tradition of group action to provide collective 
goods, such as fire protection and weed control. This provided a solid base of experience in the 
community for the subsequent organization and operation of irrigation districts. 
AGRICULTURE 
Since the inception of the project in the early 1950s, four major types of crops have comprised at 
least 75 percent of the total irrigated area in the Columbia Basin and have contributed 70 percent 
of the total returns to crop production in the area (see  Table 3). These crop groups include potatoes, 
vegetables (for processing and fresh market sales), hay and silage, and grains (wheat, barley, cereals 
and feedgrain). 
From 1955-89, hay, forage crops and feedgrain represented 30-45  percent of the total irrigated 
area, but usually produced less than 30 percent of the total gross returns. Vegetable production 
was more important in the late 195Os, covering 25 percent of the total irrigated area and generating 
more than 25 percent of the total returns to crop production. Following a sharp decline in both area 
planted and the total returns during the late 1970s, vegetable crops again increased to 15 percent 
of the total irrigated cropland by  1989 and to approximately 17 percent of the total crop returns. 
Potatoes have consistently covered I  percent to 9 percent of the irtigated area in the Columbia 
Basin, yet have generated at least 20 percent of the total value of all crops produced. On the other 
hand, wheat, barley and small grain production averaged 15-20 percent of  the irrigated area over 
the study period, producing highly variable returns ranging from 5  percent (late 1960s) to 20 
percent (late 1970s). 
Until 1975, sugar beet was a major commodity for Columbia Basin fanners, covering as much 
as 12  percent of the irrigated area and often producing more than 15 percent of the total returns. 
However, following a decline in sugar beet  prices in the mid-1970s and the closing of the Utah 
and Idaho sugar processing factory in Moses Lake in  1978, farmers substituted for sugar beet 
production with wheat, feed corn, and dry bean crops. Beet production ceased in 1979. 
Fruit crops represented less than 5 percent of the irrigated area and the total crop returns until 
the mid-1970s. after which production grew steadily, reaching 6 percent of the total irrigated area 
and 20 percent of the total returns by  1985. 
14  Clubs for rural youths which teach Earm-rrlated  skills. CHAPTER  2  22 
Table 3. Irrigated area andgmss value ofcrop  production, the CBP, 1955-89. 
Source:  Crop Production Reports for the CBP. US.  Bureau of  Reclamation. 
Other categories of crop production include seed, specialty crops and irrigated pastureland. Seed 
production  (vegetable,  grain  and  herb  seed) has  declined  in  importance  since the  1950s, 
representing less than 7 percent of both irrigated area and total returns during the 1980s. Specialty 
crops (herbs and flower bulbs) covered less than 3 percent of the irrigated area and produced less 
than 4 percent of the total returns during the study period. Irrigated pastureland has consistently 
remained between 2 percent and 5 percent of the total irrigated area since 1955, contributing less 
than 2 percent to the total crop returns. 
The cropping pattern across the CBP is clearly complex with a mixture of  both high- and 
low-value crops. Increased diversification in recent years is said, by district managers interviewed, 
to have made canal maintenance and operations more difficult because of the longer cropping 
season of some vegetable crop rotations and more varied water requirements. Within this overall 
pattern, most farmers practice a multiyear rotation of  crops on their farms. 
One interesting feature of the picture that emerges is the heavy emphasis on livestock feed 
production. Since 1965, more than 40 percent of the project area has been devoted to growing hay, 
fodder, silage, feedgrain and irrigated pasture. The market value of this output is rather low, making 
up  less than  30 percent  of the  total  value  of  gross  project  output.  Moreover,  the  ratio  of 
livestock-oriented crops’ share of the total value to their share of the total area planted has fallen 
to a low of 0.54 in the 1985-89 period, compared with a high of 0.69 for the 1955-64 period, 
suggesting that animal-oriented production may  be becoming less profitable. This is said, by 
district managersinterviewed, to beaconsequenceofthe practiceof including alfalfain therotation 
as a measure for enhancing soil fertility and because some projst lands are not suitable for 
producing higher-value crops. Alfalfa is a more remunerative crop than small grains, and it is less COLUMBIA BASIN IRRIGATION PROJUJT  23 
risky because prices are more stable. Farmers contract to supply alfalfa hay to dairy operators in 
the Puget Sound area in the western part of the state and also export cubed hay”  to Japan. 
Nevertheless,  profitability  is the fundamental  force  driving farmers’  crop decisions,  and 
cropping pattern shifts have resulted in the steadily rising total value of output in all three CBP 
districts, as shown in Figure 3.16 For the system as a whole, the annual gross value of output per 
acre more than doubled, in real terms, between 1960 and 1989, from US356  to US$828 (1982 
prices). This suggests, overall, a system which adapts well to changing external conditions and 
supports the notion that, at least in a financial sense, the system is sustainable. 
The growing share of permanent crops in the project, such as apples, has resulted in pressure 
to provide water earlier and later in the season than previously. In addition, more complex cropping 
patterns which sometimes involve growing more than one crop in a year. also create pressure on 
system managers to supply water earlier and later in the season.  This tendency is particularly strong 
in the South District, where higher temperatures allow a slightly longer growing season. Since this 
district is at the far end of the CBP, water must pass through the entire east main canal before being 
taken off for use. This leads to reducing the system conveyance efficiency during these periods. 
It is interesting to note that the SouthDistrict, which was theleastproductiveof thethreedistricts 
in  the early  years of  the project  by  a wide margin,  is  now the most productive.  A possible 
explanation for this is found in Figure 2 (p.16), where growth in sprinkler irrigation in the South 
Dismct is seen to be much stronger than in either of the other two districts. The South District also 
suffered from drainage problems which have been ameliorated by recent tile drainage programs. 
The East District, which had the soils best adapted for surface irrigation, has been the slowest to 
adopt pressurized water application systems and has seen its initial lead in  value of output per 
irrigated hectare diminish until it is now the least productive of the three districts. The Quincy 
District, which has been intermediate in sprinkler adoption, now occupies the middle position in 
terms of productivity, as it did in the late 1950s. 
I5  Hay compressed to a very high density for more economical shipping. 
16  The  sharp temporary increase peaking in  1914 is probably due to he  spike in world wheat pices which occurred ulat 
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Source: Crop Production Repons for the CBP, US.  Bureau of Reclamation. hident  of the United States, Eco- 
nomic Report of the President (Washington. D.C.: US.  Government Printing Office  1991). 
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Irrigation Institutions 
THE  U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 
THE US.  Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) was established by  the Reclamation Act of 1902 and 
was charged with the mission of "reclaiming" "the arid lands of the Western United States for 
farming through the provision of irrigation. Before World War II, the USBR had three broad goals: 
I) to provide settlement opportunities in the American West for as many settlers as  possible, 2) to 
provide subsidized and interest-free funding of irrigation projects, and 3) to promote the family 
farm as a way of life in rural America (Infanger 1974,56). The provision of irrigation was seen as 
a principal mechanism for providing  settlement opportunities and for promoting family farm 
agriculture in the arid West. 
The USBR was originally conceived as a construction and development agency and had an 
ambitious agenda for the design and construction of large dams, river-basin projects, and irrigation 
systems. Because of the policy objective of settling barren and sparsely populated land in the West, 
costs fortheseexpensive  projects wereprimarily bornebyfederal taxpayersand by hydroelectricity 
revenues. Typically, farmers were given 50  years to repay a minor share of full construction costs 
and they paid very low rates for water. Also because  of this policy orientation, and the economic 
rents involved, the USBR supported numerous laws aimed at limiting the size of irrigated farms 
and preventing speculative buying and selling of land brought under irrigation over the first several 
decades of its existence. These were only partially successful (Reisner 1987). 
The USBR is organized by watershed region across the Western U.S., with project managers 
in  charge of  particular projects under the regions. From the beginning,  the Reclamation Act 
established that the USBR  would transfer management responsibility and authority for system 
facilities to irrigation districts once construction was completed. It also established that farmers 
would be obligated to repay some negotiated portion of construction costs and all costs associated 
with project operation. 
The USBR has constructed more than 521 major water-control structures during its lifetime, 
with the Grand Coulee Dam being one of the largest. Around the time management was transferred 
in the Columbia Basin Project, however, a shift was underway in the USBRs role from that of a 
developer of large water and power projects to other tasks (Opie 1989.15). As construction activity 
diminished, the USBRs  role shifted to include supplying municipal and industrial water, river and 
reservoir regulation, flood control, and environmental regulation and management of recreation 
lands and wildlife habitats. 
The U.S.  Bureau of Reclamation shares a number of these features with water 
resources departments and ministries in developing countries. Its mandaze for 
17  The word "reclaiming" implies that Ihe land was pnviously used for agriculture. which wa  generally not the case. 
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irrigafion development  was  originally  underlain  by  strong  social  welfare 
considerafions. Throughout mosi of ifs  life, it has been primarily a construction 
agency, with litfle enfhusiasm  for handling operations and mainfenance,  and it 
has channeled heavy public subsidies on irrigation wafer  fo farmers. However, 
ihe USBR differs from nwsf  of ifs  counterparts in developing countries by ifs 
mandate (a)  fo help creafe  users' irrigafion  disfricfs  and fransfer  management 
10 them, (b)  fo negofiafe  consfrucfion  repayment schedules, and(c)  fo levy O&M 
fees on users prior fo the transfer, and  by ifs record of success in doing fhese 
things. 
IRRIGATION DISTRICTS 
Irrigation districts have long been the predominant institution for managing irrigation systems in 
the American West. Irrigation districts are quasi-municipal corporations, established under state 
law for the purpose of supplying and delivering water to irrigable land. They are generally untaxed 
nonprofit corporations constituted by water users and registered with state governments. lhey are 
often able to obtain restricted powers of eminent domain from the state for acquiring land to build 
essential irrigation facilities and may  have legal immunity from liability for certain hazards 
associated with their operations. Water rights are attached to districts through a process of  grant 
and certification by state governments. 
Water users are attached to the districts through their relationship to the irrigable land within 
the irrigation district. The districts are normally governed by a board which is elected by  a vote 
open to all landholders in the district. The districts are vested with authority for planning and 
managing irrigation operations and maintenance, raising resources to fully cover the annual costs 
of operations and maintenance and of capital replacement. andapplying sanctions against members 
who violate district rules or fail to pay  water fees. Sanctions may include cessation of wafer 
deliveries or seizure and sale of farms of violafors  by fhe  district. 
By comparison with developing countries, irrigation disfricfs  in the CBP are 
strong  legally, and  even politically.  Irrigators'  associafions in developing 
counfries  generally do nof hove the power of eminent domain or foreclosure of 
landholdings. In many developing counfries, irrigators' ossociafiom lack the 
ability to cuf  off  water deliveries as a sanction, fo let confracrs, and to obtain 
loans  from banks. These legalpowers have been essential in enabling the CBP 
to collect IOOpercenf of wafer  duties, minimize wafer  theft, andattainfinancial 
viability. 
The three irrigation districts comprising the Columbia Basin Project, the Quincy District, the 
East District, and the South District, were created in 1939. two years before completion of the 
Grand Coulee Dam  and  13 years before water began flowing through the irrigation system.'* 
Formation of the districts initiated an extended period of negotiations over repayment contracb 
for the project. Each district includes between 2,ooO and 2,500 landowners and is governed by a 
18  TheQuincy Valley Wat~r  Usen' Association.famedin 1907anddiscussedearlierinUlepaper.wasanearlyforelunner 
and namesake to  the current Quincy Irrigation District, but it beors no  direct instiNtiond connection to  tho present 
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board  of directors elected by  its members.  A district is divided into several sections, usually 
numbering between five and seven, with each section electing a director who sits on the board. 
The Quincy District has seven board members, while the two other districts each has five. Each 
director must own land in the district, although the land does not have to be developed or irrigated. 
Board members are elected for overlapping three-year terms and generally run unopposed. They 
are not remunerated. Incentives for their participation include personal satisfaction, opportunities 
for expense-paid travel, a stronger political voice, and social prestige. Boards have a wide range 
of concerns but, according to district managers and staff, some of the most significant are financial 
-raising sufficient revenue to pay for O&M and capital replacement while seeking to keep water 
assessments as low as possible. 
The district management is in the hands of full-time professional staff members. The district 
managers, who are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the districts, are engineers recruited 
through open competition. They are selected by the board of directors and are responsible to it. They 
are not landowners in the project and are typically recruited from outside the district they manage. 
Both the district managers and the USBR respondents anticipate problems arising in the event a 
project manager did own land within the district he managed. Managers are not board members, but 
do report frequently to the boards, though in smaller districts elsewhere in the region, managers 
sometimes sit as regular board members. Irrigation district management is a well-established career 
path in the American West and positions are announced in various publications. 
Typically, developing countries do not have career paths for private-sector 
irrigation managers or community organizers. However, in countries such as 
Bangladesh and China, nongovernmental organizations or small contractors 
are  increasingly  important  in  supplying  O&M management  services.  In 
Colombia and Chile, irrigation managers are now recruitedfrom the open labor 
market.  This mobility and flexibility  may  be  important for supporting 
sustainable management transfer in developing countries as well. Researchers 
have noted that institutional development and diversification often “prepare the 
terrain for privatization” (Nellis and Kikeri 1989, 670: Van De Walle 1989). 
Figures 4a. 4b and 4c show organizational charts of the three districts. Each district has two 
main divisions, an O&M Division and an Administrative Service Division. The O&M Division is 
staffed by watermasters, ditchriders, and other supporting positions. The posts of watermaster and 
ditchrider are normally long-term career positions. The Administrative Service Division handles 
budgeting, accounts, data processing, personnel  records,  inventory  control and miscellaneous 
customer services to farmers,  such  as  providing  information  or assistance  with  forms  and 
regulations. The Quincy District differs from the other two districts in that the Business Manager 
reports directly to the board  of directors and  not to the General Manager, who is  principally 
concerned with O&M. Since the districts are legally established by the state government, the state 
requires that their books be audited annually by independent certified public accountants. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USBR AND THE DISTRICTS 
Relations between the USBR and the irrigation districts are defined by public law and through 
negotiations  leading  to legally binding  contracts  and agreements.  The working  relationship 
between the districts and the USBR project personnel is generally cordial and is characterized 
by  regular communication. The USBR  representatives are invited to sit in on district board 
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Because of the size, wealth and political influence of imgation districts in the American West, the 
USBR and districts generally relate to each other as political equals, regularly negotiate solutions 
to problematic issues, and periodically sue one another when agreement is not reached. 
Throughout much of the period under discussion, the CBP farmers enjoyed the assistance of 
the powerful US.  Senators Jackson and Magn~son.’~  This led to such favorable terms for farmers 
as: 
repeated relaxation of farm size limits, 
renegotiation of repayment contracts reducing by  one-thud the proportion of total 
project costs to be repaid by farmers, 
highly subsidized power rates for lifting water from the FDR Reservoir, 
assumption of responsibility by the USBR for drain installation with fmers  to repay 
under the Wyear  repayment schedule, and 
favorable conditions for transfer of management to the districts in 1969 (discussed 
below). 
This contrasts sharply with the situation in many developing countries, where 
the irrigation agency t8ndF  to be in a superior political position to irrigators’ 
associations. However,  manipulation  of  politicians for greater  access  to 
irrigation benejirs also occurs in more democratic developing countries, such 
as  India, Sri Lanka  and the Philippines. 
The official relationship  between the USBR  and an irrigation district  is  established  by a 
“repayment contract,” which is an obligation attached to imgable land lying within the district, 
and associated landowners, regardless of whether or not available project water is used by the 
individual. Longstanding reclamation law requires landholders to repay the federal government, 
at no interest, for their apportioned share of costs of consrmction of dams, imgation structures and 
drainage systems. During the repayment period, the USBR generally has the right to resume direct 
management of the system if it chooses, primarily upon grounds of failure by the districts to follow 
the repayment schedule or to adequately maintain the system. Even after the repayment period is 
completed, however, title to the facilities remains with the USBR, unless otherwise specified by 
the U.  S. Congress. According to the CBP inigation district lawyers, this provision is valued by 
the districts as a way of insuring continuing immunity from certain kinds of legal liability to which 
they would otherwise be exposed. 
In  the Columbia Basin Roject, system construction plans, water supply contracts, and the 
imgation districts’ repayment share were all negotiated between the USBR and the three irrigation 
districts in 1944 and 1945-well before the canal networks were constructed and any water was 
delivered. Prior to completion of project construction, water users also agreed to pay the “full” 
cost of OW.  exclusive of implicit subsidies such as below-market rates for pumping lift energy. 
19  Senator Mapuson reprcsemed Washington Stlte fmm  1944  until  1981.  Senator Jackson  occupied  the  other 
Washington scnate seat fmm 1953 until 1981, The  pair thus  represented lhe stltc during much of the  active history of 
the CBP  and,  because  of lheir seniority, wcn  in powerfvl positions at the  lime lhe management transfer conVacfs were 
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Following the period of negotiations, 98 percent of the imgation district farmers accepted the 1945 
Repayment Contracts.zo  These agreements, one with each district, provided that water users would 
pay an average of US$85 per acre for project construction costs, repayable over 40 years. Rules 
allowed a 10-year “development period” for deferral of repayment, which effectively extended the 
repayment  period  to 50 years.  The initial  1945  repayment contracts with  the districts  were 
subsequently revised or amended in 1951,1952,1953,1958,1962,1963,1965,1966,  and 1969. 
The 1963 renegotiation extended the repayment period to 50 years, in addition to the  10-year 
deferral period. Since the CBP fanners did not begin making repayments until 1960, repayment 
will continue until the year 2010. 
The project remains  incomplete, with  roughly half  of  the originally envisioned  area still 
unimgated. The development of Phase Two of the project has been discussed repeatedly over the 
past 40 years without agreement among the involved parties. In  1968, expansion plans were 
shelved indefinitely when fanners refused to agree to repayment terms being proposed by  the 
USBR. As an alternative to the development of the full 1.1  million acre area. the enlargement of 
the East Low Canal area by developing an additional 87,000 acres of irrigated land has  also been 
discussed, but not implemented. Full cost recovery, as calculated by the USBR, depends on the 
development of  the full project to cover the cost of the shared facilities. Responsibility for this 
share of project costs, if Phase Two is ever formally abandoned, is not clear. 
The main resistance to additional development now comes from environmental interests. The 
State of Washington, which would be required to foot a significant portion of the bill under new 
federal  legislative  guidelines,  has generally  favored  this  additional development,  though  its 
position is not unified. Moves by the state to issue a new water permit for the expansion would 
almost certainly generate fierce controversy. Some fanners in the already completed part of the 
project are also reluctant to see additional development, fearing that the resulting increase in 
agricultural production from the area would depress local commodity prices. Local food processing 
industries tend  to support development for the same reason, and  the business community  is 
naturally  supportive.  Landholders  who  would  receive  irrigation  benefits  are  also  generally 
supportive. 
Under the 1945 repayment agreement, irrigators were responsible for all subsequent drainage 
construction. By  the  1960s, farmers were becoming concerned ahout the expected costs of a 
growing need for subsurface drainage and had requested the USBR to assume responsibility for 
drainage construction. In return, the districts agreed to “cover” additional costs to the USBR by 
increasing the repayment amount to US$131.60 per acre (US$325 per ha), up from the previous 
rate of  US$85  per  acre. This  increase, amounting  10  US$46.60 per  acre, would  generate an 
additional US$26,550,396 if payment were forthcoming from the entire 569,751 acre area of the 
system.Asof30September 1991, US$118,150,000hadbeenspentbytheUSBRtodrain  115,970 
acres, with an estimated 37,170 acres which require drainage remaining at an estimated cost of 
US$61,413,000. The  total  cost  of  installing the  required  drainage  would  then  amount  to 
US$179,563,000, of which repayments would cover ahout 15 percent. The actual share of the 
repayment is somewhat less than  this, however, since these are “book values” which  do not 
consider the time value of money. 
In total, the new repayment contracts obligate district farmers to pay US$2.63 per acre (US$6.50 
per ha) per year toward capital costs. Assuming a peak irrigable area of 569,751 acres, the total 
20  This figure is not as impressive as it might appear. since the vst  rnajorily of farms  now occupying the CBP land did 
not exist in 1945. Dora (1979) indicates hat the taral number of farm uNtE in the CBP  in 1948 was 80 and that 
the  total project farm population in  1950 was 140.  This suggests that less than  100 people my  have voted an these 
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recovery will be US$74,979,23  1. This has a present value of US$8.547,632, assuming an 8 percent 
discount rate and the money being paid back in 11 to 50 yews (Doka 1979). Under the original 
agreement, farmers were to pay approximately 18 percent of construction costs. Under the revised 
1963 agreement, the proportion of total project construction cost to be repaid by the districts was 
reduced to about 12 percent. Such favorable terms for the districts reflect their powerful political 
clout with elected officials, as well as long-standing public policy respecting irrigated agriculture. 
A  common situation in developing  countries is a relative absence  of strong 
formal  locnl  organizational  struciures. Governments first  work to organize 
groups  of farmers  into formal  water  users’ organizations, after which 
mnnagement is handed OIU?~  to them according io ierms set by the government. 
In the Columbia Basin, by  contrast, there was little of this type of consciousness-raising and 
inducement of farmer participation. This would  seem to stem from the fact that farmers were 
already experienced in establishing and managing local organizations for other purposes, were on 
an equivalent legal and political footing with the USBR, and had accepted their obligation to pay 
for O&M services themselves. They thus had an incentive to assume management responsibility 
to keep down the costs of O&M and make management more “customer-oriented.” CHAPTER 4 
Management Transfer 
MOTIVATION FOR TRANSFER 
Farmer Perspectives 
SINCE THEIR CREATION, the districts knew that responsibility for O&M would eventually fall to 
them. The Fact-Finder’s Act of  1927 established that after 50 percent of  a USBR  project is 
constructed, O&M should be transferred to irrigation districts. So the districts were interested not 
in trying to prevent management transfer. which they knew was inevitable, but in trying to get the 
best terms possible. According to district officers and lawyers interviewed, farmers’ primary 
interests were in obtaining more local control over water allocation, water fee structures, O&M 
expenditures, and drainageways and in minimizing water charges. 
The following are quotes from a letter to the US.  Department of the Interior written in 1964 
by a farmer leader in the project (not without some hyperbole, perhaps). 
We ow here on the project feel that ... most of the Bureau employees ...  are only 
interested  in  having  a permanent job  ....  They get  their pajchecks from the 
government. but we pay the bill. They should be working for us. 
..  .mos  rof the Bureaupeople are just interested in going by ihe bookand getting 
a regular paycheck The last thing they think about is how what ihey’re doing 
affects the  farmer. 
We don’t wani the Bureau spending our O&M money either, just lo get things 
the way they want them-ifthe turnout is roo  low-and lots of them are-then 
they should be fixed with construction money. 
Mostly, we want to run our own show, to live with our own mistakes, and nor 
repeat them, andprofit by our own actions. 
One clear theme in these statements and in the views of farmers is the assertion of the right to 
local control over a resource for which they are paying, with the underlymg assumption that local 
management would be both cheaper and more responsive. 
USBR Perspectives 
Aresponsetotheaboveletter fromarepresentative of the U.S. Department ofthelnteriorcontained 
the following statements. 
We would  like to reiterate  ...  that the policy of this Department. with the full 
support of the Congress, has been fo  maximize local operalion and maintenance 
offederally constructed irrigation facilities .... The success of thispolicy can be 
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assuredonly ifallparties  concernedagree on terms and conditions under which 
the operation  and  maintenance is to be  transferred, and  these  terms  and 
conditionsmust be such that the interestsofboth the UnitedStatesandthe water 
users are protected. 
...  the Commissioner of Reclamation ...  assures me that he is  anxious to work out 
terms and  conditions  under  which the operation and  maintenance  can be 
transferred. 
A clear theme implicit in the above statement is the Government‘s acknowledgement that the 
districts should take over management and its fundamental acceptance of a process of negotiation 
with the districts as a means for evolving a workable relationship between the two. 
Budgetary  pressures  in the late  1960s related  to  the  war  in  Vietnam  and  the  Federal 
Government’s  ‘War on  Poverty”  prompted renewed  interest  at top levels  of  the USBR  in 
transferring management responsibilities to the disbicts as soon as possible. 
At the regional and project levels, in addition to a need to  be responsive to superiors in 
Washington,  the  USBR  was  also  interested  in  shedding responsibility for farm-level  water 
deliveries and water service contracts to enable it to focus on its development mission and on 
basin-level regulatory activities. These interests were reciprocal. The farmers did not like the “red 
tape” of government management and the USBR did not want the headaches of  dealing with 
thousands of individual fanners. 
In developing countries, the most prevalent motive for irrigation management 
transfer is to relievefimcial pressures in a sector where it is  presumed that 
fanners can assume additional costs. Because of the financial pow pattern 
which typically prevail, the initiative for turnover tends to come from  finance 
or  planning  departments  rather  than from  irrigation agencies themselves. 
Unlike the situation in the CBP,  farmers in developing countries ofen  pay only 
a  token amount for irrigation service prior  to management transfer. 
Neveriheless, farmers in developing countries sometimes opt  for  private-sector 
management when a choice is available (Vermillion 1992).  lfreduced costs can 
be promised, farmers clearly have an interest in supporting the transfer concept. 
Governments  are in  a  more  challenging situation  if  management  transfer 
involves  an increase  in farmer  costs for irrigation, since  they  must  then 
demonstrate  that irrigation service  will  improve as a result  of  the change 
(Gerards 1992). 
The perception of  the CBP farmers that the USBR was inefficient and unresponsive to local 
needs resembles a frequent perception of farmers in developing countries about irrigation agencies. 
When agency management is poor, fanners sometimes supplement it informally with their own 
resources (IUII 1989). 
The proliferation ofprivate tubewells throughout South Asiais, in pacaresponseto ineffective 
public-sector irrigation management. 
Fanners are often willing to pay several times more for private tubewell water than for water 
frompublic tubewells orcanal systemsforthe perceived valueofimprovedcontrol overtheamount 
and timing of irrigation (Chambers et al. 1989; Repetto 1986). MANAGEMENT TRANSFER  37 
TRANSFER PROCESS 
In the early 1960s. Floyd Dominy, Commissioner of the USBR of Reclamation. gave the CBP a 
strong push to move ahead quickly with transfer negotiations. The districts hired lawyers who, 
together with elected district board members, entered into a protracted process of negotiation, 
hydrologic and economic studies, and legal analysis with project staff. The research helped reduce 
some of  the  uncertainties  about  the  cost  and  equity  implications  of  various  options  being 
considered. Negotiations began in earnest in 1966, and transfer agreements were drafted between 
1967 and 1968. 
Negotiations were complicated by  the fact that there were three independent districts taking 
over management. Moreover, some project facilities were shared among two or three of  the 
districts. There were six primary issue areas which had to be settled among the three districts and 
the USBR. These were: 
Determining which parts of the system should be transferred to the districts and which 
kept within the USBRs responsibility as “reserved works.” 
Deciding whether management should be handled by a single federated body or carried 
out individually by  each of the districts. 
Realigning the district boundaries to facilitate district accountability for management 
and payments. 
Deciding how to allocate between the districts’ primary pumping costs and the costs 
of operating and maintaining several “joint works,” which are facilities used by two 
or more districts, such as the Banks Lake, the Potholes Reservoir, and the main supply 
and drainage canals. Cost allocation issues were complicated by  factual questions 
concerning the extent of return flows, conveyance losses, and the quality of waste 
water. 
Establishing maintenance standards for facilities to be turned over. 
Setting personnel  policies including salaries, severance payments, and retirement 
plans for the USBR staff transferred to the districts. 
Issues  one through  four involved  considerable  negotiation among  the three  districts,  and 
agreement among the districts was often more difficult to achieve than that between the districts 
and the USBR. Despite the fact that both the USBR and the districts wanted the transfer to proceed, 
discussions were sometimes heated. The USBR often took initiative to draft plans and agreements 
and to conduct cost studies and this was sometimes resented by the farmers. It was reported that 
in one meeting in 1965, a district official stated that “they [the districts], and not the USBR,  will 
be taking the initiative to achieve the takeover” (Othello Outlook 1965). 
Over a period of about five years, the districts gradually came to agreement over water and cost 
allocation and over which works should be (a) reserved by the USBR. (b) managed jointly between 
districts, and (c) transferred to individual districts. Mutual concessions were made by  districts 
regarding alignment of O&M responsibilities and apportionment of costs. One of the last obstacles 
was overcome when the USBR dropped its insistence that the districts cover severance payments 
for the USBR staff transferred to the districts. This permitted completion of  the final transfer 
agreements,  which  are unglamorously  referred  to  as “Amendatory,  Supplemental,  and 
Replacement Repayment Contracts.’’ They were signed on December  1968 and took effect on 
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In contrast to many transfer programs in developing countries, the  transfer 
process in the CBP was characterized not by efforts to organize and motivate 
farmers to comply with governmentprograms, but by extended negotiation until 
terms and conditions mutually acceptable for the government and the farmers 
were agreed upon. 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF TRANSFER AGREEMENTS 
It  wasthe‘kare, operation and maintenance” ofthe  irrigation system which was finally transferred 
to the Quincy, East, and the South irrigation districts, and not ownership itself. 
The following are the more important terms and conditions which were agreed to. 
District Rights 
The districts  can  determine  basic  and excess  water charges to  farmers, although 
charges for the basic allocation remain related to land productivity classes. 
The districts can enter into water service contracts to supply excess water to farmers 
outside the districts. However, the districts may not sell water rights since the transfer 
of water rights from one landholding to another is prohibited. 
The districts have rights of eminent domain and foreclosure on land. They are not 
liable for damages resulting from the storage, conveyance, seepage, overflow, and 
discharge of water either to other districts or to individuals. 
The districts are allowed to purchase heavy equipment and supplies from the project 
with  a  ten-year payment  schedule. This  included  such  vehicles as tractors, road 
graders, and pick-up trucks. 
The districts have theright to obtain revenues by developing power-generation stations 
within the system or by other “miscellaneous” means. The right to generate power was 
considered concessional by the USBR, since the districts pay an extremely low rate 
for the primary lifting of water from the FDR Reservoir. 
District Responsibilities 
The districts must comply with the agreed conshuction repayment schedule, which 
includes partial repayment for drainage construction. 
The districts  are responsible for all operations and maintenance for facilities used 
individually and jointly by the districts, in accordance with the USBR standards of 
performance and financial viability. 
The districts  are responsible for paying  their mutually  agreed  proportions  of  the 
recurrent costs of  special “reserved works” which were retained for management by 
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The dismcts are responsible for making annual payments into a capital replacement 
reserve fund at a rate equal to 30 percent of 5-year average annual O&M costs. They 
must eventually replace deteriorated facilities with this fund. 
The districts must report maintenance plans annually, in advance, to the USBR. 
USBR Rights 
The USBR has the right to resume direct management of the system if the districts fail 
to make their construction repayments,  pay for the O&M  of  reserved  works, or 
properly maintain the system. 
The USBR staff affected by the management change would be transferred either to 
other USBR projects (as was the case with most construction staff)  or to the districts 
themselves (as was the case with most O&M staff). By agreement, most of  the initially 
employed district management staff were former USBR CBP employees. 
Salaries and  benefits of  transferred USBR staff members such as ditchriders and 
watermasters remained at the levels prevailing before transfer. Federal retirement 
plans for transferred staff were cashed in or suspended and new district retirement 
plans were. started, although without considering seniority. 
USBR Responsibilities 
The USBR has responsibility to manage the “reserved works” which serve the entire 
project. These included the Grand Coulee Pumping Plant, the Banks Lake, the Main 
Canal, and the Potholes Reservoir. 
The USBR conducts operations and maintenance reviews (or “examinations”) every 
three years to audit 0&M  performance standards of the districts and make recommen- 
dations for improvements. 
The USBR retains ownership of the facilities operated by the districts, at least until 
completion of repayment or replacement of facilities by the districts. However, under 
current law. wholesale transfer of ownership of system facilities to the districts would 
take an act of Congress. The districts favor the retention of legal title for facilities by 
the USBR, since they believe this protects them from certain legal liabilities. 
The USBR must report, in advance, its maintenance and repair plans for its reserved 
works to the districts, on an annual basis. 
The Government will acquire needed rights-of-way for water movement within the 
project area. 
The strong legal position of the farmer irrigation districts and the protracted 
period of negotiation between them and the USER resulted in a relative balance 
between district rights and responsibilities. In developing countries, there is a 
tendency  for  governments to emphasize transjerof responsibiliiies to  the neglect 
of  transfer of  rights (Ambler 1992). A  balance  between  transferred 40  CHAPTER 4 
responsibilities  and  rights, and  expected  increase  in  local  control  and  net 
financial gain  to  the farmers, were  motivating conditions which made the 
transfer acceptable to the CBP  farmers. Where this is nut the case, considerably 
greater resistance to transfer on the part offarmers is probable. 
MANAGEMENT CHANGES SINCE THE TRANSFER 
The  USBR 
Since transfer, the USBR has drastically curtailed its direct O&M activity and has taken on new 
roles in environmental regulation and land management. About 210 USBR project staff positions, 
mostly in O&M, were abolished by the transfer, and 80 to 90  percent of the USBR staff occupying 
these positions  transferred to the districts. Others retired or were transferred to other USBR 
projects. In 1968, the year before the handover, the USBR project staff numbered 841 (Table 4). 
The year following the transfer, this number had dropped to 612, a decline of 27 percent. The most 
abrupt change came in the Irrigation and Land Division, which is mainly concerned with system 
O&M. 
The strength of this division declined by nearly two-thirds, from 301 to 103 staff members. The 
next year, the power division was  transferred to an  independent office, which,  coupled with 
continuing  declines in  all  other employee categories, further reduced the  number of  project 
employees to 247. In 1973, a number of staff in the Irrigation and Land Division who were involved 
in constructing drainage works were transferred into the Engineering and Construction Division, 
making the Irrigation and Land Division almost entirely devoted to main system management and 
land issues and leaving it with 28 staff members. By  1985, the total project staff strength had 
declined to 83, with 22 of  these in the Imgation and Land Division. 
Today, there  are only 7  USBR  positions  in O&M, compared with  12 handling land  and 
environmental regulation and water rights. One of these positions is a new one, established to 
handle coordination between the project and the district offices for operations and maintenance 
activities, water service contracts, land and water rights, licenses and permits, and so on. Figure 5 
shows the dramatic overall drop in the USBR CBP staff which occurred in 1969 and 1970 and the 
sustained, gradual decline thereafter. 41 





















































































































Source:  US  Bureau of Reclamation data. 
Data are  missing for the years 1%2.1964.1966,1978  and 1984. 


















































83 Figure 5.  Number of USER staffassigned to the CBe by division, 1961-85. 
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Sourcc: U.S.  Bureau of Reclamation data. 
Nore: Data are missing for the  years 1962, 1964, 1966.  1978 and  1984. Figure excludes Power Division which became independent in 1969. 
P  N MANAGEMENT TRANSFER  43 
The Districts 
Just prior to management transfer, each of  the districts had only a handful of staff. The South 
District, for example, had  a manager, an administrative assistant, and a bookkeeper. The first 
district managers were not transferred from the CBP but were openly recruited by  the district 
boards. However, all three new managers had previous district or USBR experience. Most of the 
staff from the level of watermaster and below were transferred from the USBR to the districts. 
Immediately following management turnover in 1969, the South District had 65 staff members. 
By  1991, because of expanding service area, the district staff had grown to 90 paid employees 
serving 200,781 acres, an average of 2,231 acres (903 ha) per staff member. In the same year, the 
Quincy Dismct had 94 employees for 221,593 acres, or 2,357 acres (954 ha), per employee, and 
the more concentrated East District area had 68 employees serving 135,154 acres, or 1,988 acres 
(804 ha) per staff member. Staff levels in each of these districts is said, by district managers, to 
have declined  in recent years. According to the East District manager, staff reductions in the 
mid-1980s reduced the staff share of the operating budget in his district from around 61 percent 
to about 53 percent of the total. One district manager noted that staffing in his district was “thin” 
after the cutback, implying that they may have gone too far. 
Improved technology is a major factor in these reductions. Extensive use of two-way radios, 
personal computers in each watermaster’s station and at district headquarters, and telemetry for 
reporting system status information have all reduced the need for staff. In addition, center pivot 
sprinklers now used by most farmers require fewer changes in delivery schedules. Offsetting these 
increases in staff productivity to some extent are increased reporting requirements, such as those 
mandated by the Reclamation Reform Act. 
The districts can and do fire staff. The Quincy District has released about five staff in the past 
two years, even though ditchriders and O&M service staff are unionized. However, one district 
manager argues that unions have stymied further shrinkageof staff levels which would have taken 
place otherwise. 
The district O&M personnel handle all water allocation functions down to the fam  turnout with 
little farmer interference reported. Measurement of deliveries at the turnout has largely eliminated 
water-related disputes among farmers and between farmers and the district. The Quincy District 
reports about six cases a year where farmers cut locks on their turnouts to change settings. This is 
normally done when a farmer wants to stop the flow of  water quickly, as when a center pivot 
sprinkler breaks down. The district managers understand such needs and do not regard this as a 
major problem. On occasions when locks have been cut for other purposes, the districts have been 
less tolerant but are able to fine farmers only for the cost of replacing the lock. Higher fines have 
been held by the courts to be illegal. The districts have the power to stop delivery of water in the 
event of nonpayment of water assessments by farmers and have exercised this power rigorously. 
For example, since management transfer, the Quincy District has foreclosed and sold more than 
20 landholdings due to nonpayment of  water charges. 
The districts have established excess water use policies. Owing to increasing concern about 
possible damage to lands and drainageways resulting from overirrigation, the districts have raised 
the charges for use of water in excess of the base allotment. As an example, in 1987, the Quincy 
District established new rules imposing graduated excess charges ranging from 20 percent more 
than the base rate for 2 acre-feet in excess of the water allotment, up to 500 percent over the base 
rate for an unlikely 6.5 to 8.5 acre-feet in excess of the water allotment. Previously, a flat rate was 
charged for all excess water deliveries. Because of the high thresholds involved, this graduated 
charging scheme is largely symbolic for the moment. It does suggest an area of concern and a 44  CHAPTER 4 
tentative willingness to act however.*l The Quincy Board resolution also allows the district 
manager to refuse to deliver excess water if he determines that the excessive water application by 
the farmer is causing damage to adjoining lands or is exceeding the drainage capacity of thedistrict. 
One change in operating rules mandated by  the transfer agreements was the establishment of a 
“share design capacity” principle in making water deliveries. Under this rule, the project and the 
districts guarantee allocation of at least 25.3 percent of a fanner’s annual basic allotment within a 
given 30-day period. The rule was designed to insure that a minimum proportion of the annual 
water supply to which a farmer is entitled is available in any given month of the growing season. 
Most othex aspects of the water management system and the organization of maintenance were 
continued with surprisingly little intemption after the management transfer. This can be  explained 
by the fact that new district O&M positions were filled largely by ex-USBR staff and that water 
allocation procedures in place prior to the transfer worked reasonably well. 
kh  of the districts is involved in granting water service contracts to landholdings not included 
in the imgation district. The districts argue that the water used for this purpose is mostly derived 
from existing allocations to the districts for waste, seepage, return flows, or water draining to 
adjoining lands. The regular water service contract normally guarantees allotments for a limited 
time period at  the sameO&M assessment level applying to district members, together with a partial 
construction repayment requirement. A second class of intermptible contracts does not guarantee 
water delivery, and the fee includes only a partial O&M assessment. The districts now collect fees 
directly from fanners receiving service from the district. Prior to the transfer, water assessments 
were collected by county assessors. 
The districts contract with the USBR for performance of some management functions which 
fall within the district’s area of responsibility under the transfer contract agreements. The East 
District, for example, contracts with the USBR to manage the district main canal, although the 
other two districts handle main canal operations themselves. The main computer and telemetry 
receiver for the automatic data acquisition and control system bought by  the districts have been 
installed in the USBR  office in Ephrata rather than in one of the district offices, and the USBR 
staff members monitor system status and manage this data system. This indicates the close working 
relationship which has evolved in the wake of the transfer. 
The district boards are continually looking for ways to keep water charges down. One strategy 
has been to raise revenue through secondary enterprises to cover part of the O&M cost and to 
supply reservefund requirements. In 1980, the districts agreed on a joint power development plan 
and have jointly developed seven hydroelectric power stations throughout the system. The largest 
is a 92-megawatt station at the 165-foot Summer Falls located at the outflow from the Banks Lake. 
These facilities have been developed by municipal power and light companies which provided the 
US$167  million financing and contracted to purchase the power produced. The districts receive 
about two mills (two-tenths of  a cent) per kilowatt hour currently. with  the remainder of the 
districts’ share being retained by the power companies to retire construction debtobligations. When 
these obligations are fully satisfied, the revenue to the districts from power production will increase 
sharply. Amortization schedules for the power installations range from 10 to 40 years. 
Under the original repayment agreement of 1945, imgation districts were charged 0.5 mill per 
kilowatt-hour (KWH) for water pumping costs at the Grand Coulee. This rate continues in effect, 
despite the rise in summertime market value of power to about 17 mills per KWH. The USBR is 
seeking to raise the rate charged to the districts to 0.95 mill per KWH, claiming that this is the cost 
of generating the power, and the issue is currently in court. 
21  In comast, some California water disfncls have implemented much steeper rate schedules which do have practical 
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Only a minority of farmers generally attend district meetings. However, despite this indication 
of some detachment, district managers and lawyers for thedistricts report that farmers aregenerally 
satisfied with the performance of the irrigation districts. 'Ihe district managers indicate that they 
take this as  a sign of approval, and that when there are problems with water deliveries in the district, 
farmers turn out for district meetings in strength. Routine matters of district policy and management 
are generally left to the board and the professional managers. The districts have continued to 
successfully manage daily operation of this intensive arranged-demand system since 1969, with 
the exception of one day-the day four inches of volcanic ash from Mount St. Helens fell on the 
project. 
Development professionals ofen Weal attendance at organizatioml meetings 
as an indication of the strengfh of the organization and of  the ef/ectiveness of 
its managemeni. The CBP experience suggests that this may be an unreliable 
indicator and that, when  the opportunity cost of farmers'  time is high, the 
opposite may be true. 
With respect to management impacts of transfer, the most significant changes appear to be the 
Operational management changed very little, partly because most of the field operations staff 
introduction of secondary revenue sources and downward pressure on staff and staffing costs. 
remained in the system after transfer. 
This was also the case with irrigation management transfer in Colombia, in 
South America, although  in  this case farmers had  less opportunity  to fire 
unproductive staff  This is generally a  thorny problem in mosf developing 
countries. especially where the private sector has limited capacity to absorb the 
personnel released. In some countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, 
farmers themselves may take over some management tasks. CHAPTER 5 
Results of the Transfer 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
IN THIS  CHA~R  of the paper, interrupted time series analysis is employed to assess the impact of 
the change in management mode on system performance. Following the approach outlined in Small 
and  Svendsen (1992), important parameters of  the evaluation are specified here, keyed to the 
outline reproduced in the Appendix to this paper: (a) The evaluation is focused primarily on the 
irrigation system, though the agricultural system and the agricultural economic system are also 
considered, (b) The distribution and application subsystems receive primary attention, (c) Plan- 
ning, design, and construction processes are described but not analyzed. Primary focus  is on the 
processes of  system operation, maintenance and support, (d) The purpose of carrying out the 
evaluation is to assess the results of a large-scale management change, (e) Performance measures 
employed  primarily  measure  irrigation  system  outputs  and  impacts, rather  than the  internal 
processes of the system, (f)  Both achievement and efficiency measures are employed, (8) Since 
most of the comparisons made are across time within the same system, it is usually necessary to 
know only the desired direction of change. Standards are derived from positive values placed on 
increased irrigation efficiency, increased farm incomes, reduced public and private costs, and 
sustainable operation of the system. Further insight might result from a more elaborate treatment 
based on the possibly differing values of the different actors involved, and (h) A number of years 
of experience are involved in specifying both before-change and after-change performance. 
Data for the analysis were obtained principally from the USBR office in Ephrata and from the 
three irrigation districts. Annual time series data were obtained on area irrigated?’  discharge at 
various points  in the conveyance  system, aggregate discharge at system turnouts, area  under 
various water application technologies, area planted by  crop, gross value of agricultural output by 
crop, district revenue by source, O&M expenditure by category, and personnel levels by function. 
Aggregate potential evapotranspiration (PET) data were computed from cropped area figures and 
multiyear  crop-specific PET averages for  sites  within  the  project  area obtained  from  the 
Washington State University. Most data were available on an irrigation district basis, though the 
analysis is concentrated on the project as a whole. Periods of record vary, but for most variables a 
time series of 20 to 30 years is available. 
22  ArenfigunsfmrntheUSBR WaterDistributionRepon~oftendidnatagreeeiactlywithsimilarfiguresfmmthe USBR 
Crop Production Reports. For most purpases. figures from the Water Distribution Reports were used in the analysis. 
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CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY 
It is  the view  of  the  district managers that adoption of  new  technologies  such as hydraulic 
excavators, two-way radios, telemetry, and sprinklers was facilitated by management transfer. 
Their argument is that the districts were more open than the USBR to new ideas and technologies, 
were more flexible and were able to make quicker decisions. 
This  argument is more relevant  in  the case of main  system  operation  and  maintenance 
technologies than in the case of water application technology. The widespread adoption of center 
pivot sprinkler irrigation has been one of the most dramatic technological changes occurring in 
the project in the past 25 years. However, sprinkler systems are owned and operated by individual 
farmers, and their adoption is driven more by financial factors, such as rising labor costs and the 
higher yields often obtained under sprinkler irrigation, than  by  the management  mode of the 
irrigation system. It is difficult to know what would have happened had the USBR continued to 
manage the scheme. At the very least, one can say that the adoption of  new technology does not 
appear tn have been hampered by the transfer of management responsibilities to the districts, and 
may well have been enhanced. 
The conversion to center pivot sprinkler systems does have main system management and 
efficiency implications though. On  the one  hand, sprinklers tend to operate steadily for  long periods 
of time thus requiring ditchriders to make fewer changes in turnout settings, and on the other, when 
problems  occur with  a center pivot  sprinkler system, the fanner wants the water turned  off 
immediately, and will do this himself if necessary. This can create large unplanned fluctuations in 
system laterals and lead to more water running to waste. In addition, center pivot sprinklers with 
swing spans at the ends to fill in the corners of square fields do not operate continuously, turning 
on and then off as the system rotates through a comer. Because the full supply requirement must 
be available to the center pivot sprinklers when required, this can result in 10 to 15 percent of the 
water turned out being wasted, according to the district managers. 
QUALITY OF IRRIGATION SERVICE 
One of the most important potential impacts of the transition to self-management is the effect on 
quality of irrigation service to farmers. Quality of irrigation service can be defined in terms of three 
characteristics-adequacy of water supplied by  the irrigation system, timeliness of  the supplies, 
and equity of  distribution across system subdivisions. In general, a useful indicator must consist 
of a performance measure, a standard, and rules for evaluating the measure against the standard. 
When inter-temporal comparisons involving a single system are intended, it is necessary only to 
know the desired direction of change for a particular indicator. 
Several  salient features  of the CBP underlie the following  analysis. First, the CBP is  a 
water-surplus system. Both its water right and its main pumping capacity exceed current demand. 
Canal capacity is apotential constraint to increasing supplies, but has not been an active constraint 
in recent years. Sand,  the CBP is a demand-driven system. Farmers place orders for water, 
specified in terms of discharge, duration, and delivery date and the system delivers water, also as 
specified in these terms. 
Consequently, it is assumed here that farmers place orders for water, based on their perceptions 
of the PET requirements of  their crops. PET is assumed to represent the expressed demand for 
water. Ideally. an evaluation like this would take place in two stages. First, the orders placed would 
be compared with crop water requirements to determine the appropriateness of the orders. Then, 
orders would be compared with actual deliveries to determine the system’s  effectiveness in meeting RESULTS OF THE  TRANSFER  49 
the farmer-specified demand for water. In this case, although information on individual orders and 
deliveries is available in district files, it was deemed too expensive and time-consuming to  sample, 
retrieve, and analyze it. As a result, a one-stage analysis was used, employing the assumption that 
PET represents the farmer demand for water. 
Adequacy 
Figure 6 shows the quantity of water turned into the system's three main canals at the bifurcation 
and from the Potholes Reservoir, and the project water right at the Columbia River. The fact that 
supply exceeds the water right does not indicate a violation of  the right, as the total includes 
Potholes water which consists largely of  irrigation return flows. It is thus "counted twice" with 
respect to the withdrawal permit. The quantity turned into system main canals shows a steady 
increase with time as imgated area expanded, until about 1973. It is roughly stable from then until 
1985 when it begins to rise again. Figure 6 also shows the aggregate amount of water delivered to 
farm-level turnouts over time. This value too shows a steady rise until 1973, when it stabilizes at 
around 2 million acre-feet (2.5 billion cubic meters) and holds constant at that level until the end 
of the period. It does not show the pronounced rise in level that main canal supply does after 1985. 
Aggregate PET  demand is less volatile, exhibiting steady growth throughout the period?3 but at  a 
rate which declines with time. 
In Figure 7, data on supplies from the Potholes Reservoir have been deleted so that the two 
supply curves and the demand line relate only to virgin water pumped from the Columbia River?4 
Now it is seen that water withdrawals have remained comfortably within the water right limit.2s 
The maximum withdrawal, 2.7 million acre-feet (3.3 billion cubic meters), occurred in 1988, 
the year in which incremental area was added to the system and the water right was increased. Seen 
again in this figure is the steady divergence between main canal supplies to the two districts and 
the aggregate deliveries to farm turnouts. This divergence will be explored further in the discussion 
of system efficiency. 
While the volume of water supplied was steadily growing, the area served was also expanding 
(see Figure 1 [p.7]). In order to understand what happened to water deliveries on a unit area basis, 
it is necessary to standardize water volume by dividing by area served. When this is done for total 
aggregate supply at the heads of the three main canals, the result is shown in Figure 8. It is seen 
that the amount of water supplied to the three districts increased sharply in 1969 and 1970, the first 
two years of district management. In  1971, a steady decline from this peak of just over 6.3 
acre-feeuacre begins which continues for the next  15  years, ending at a value of  around 5.7 
acre-feeuacre, a drop of about 10 percent. In 1986, a rapid rise commences in the amount of water 
supplied to the districts per unit area irrigated which lasts until the record ends in  1989. The 
implications of this rise will be explored later in the analysis. 
23  To some extent. this is an aniftifact of the computational procedure used, since longer-term average values of PET for 
panicular cmps are used in the computation. Year-lo-year changes in aggregate water demand thus reflect variations 
in crop mix and total area irrigated only. 
24  Theraw supply tothe EaslMainCanal,infact.includesasmallamountoffeedwaterdeliveredtothePofholesReselvoir 
for use in the South Dlsuict. Feedwater has averaged about 5 percent of total supply delivered to the  bifurcation since 
1972. This amount  is included in the amount diverted shown in Figure 7, but is deducted from the  East Main Canal 
supply shown in Figure 6 since ddivenes from the Potholes Reservoir to the South Dishiicr ace explicitly included in 
the amount turned into the  ulree main canals. 
25  This assumes no  net year-to-year change in storage in the  Banks Lake,  no net inflows to the Banks Lake not lifted fmm 
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I RESULTS OF  THE TRANSFER  53 
When aggregate supplies to turnouts are put on a similar per unit area basis, it is apparent that 
water deliveries per unit area have declined continuously, from about 4.2 feet in the late 1950s to 
about 3.7 feet in the late 1980s (Figure 9). There is no obvious discontinuity in this trend associated 
with the 1969  transfer of management responsibility:6  indicating that the additional water ordered 
by the districts in the years immediately following the transfer did not reach farm turnouts and was 
lost in the district distribution systems. A pronounced decline in per acre water deliveries to farm 
turnouts occurs during the 1970s, coincident with the period of most rapid growth in area under 
sprinkler irrigation (Figure 2 [p.161). This decline may be related to the shift to a more efficient 
application technology. 
However, cropping patterns also changed during this time, and it is possible that a shift to less 
water-intensive crops may have reduced the aggregate crop demand for water. To examine this 
possibility, crop-weighted aggregate annual PET for the CBP is plotted in Figure lo."  The graph 
shows two distinct periods-a rising trend between 1955 and 1972 and a declining one from 1973 
to the end of the period?'  The second period can also be subdivided into a period of sharp decline 
from  1973 to 1981 and a period of relatively constant PET thereafter. The major drop between 
1978  and 1979 is associated with the complete phasing out of sugar beets, the most water-intensive 
crop grown in the basin, and its replacement with vegetables, one of the least water-intensive crop 
groups grown. 
Between 1973  and 1981, the period of rapid decline, unit area PET fell by 7.6 percent as a result 
of cropping pattern shifts, while water deliveries per unit area, shown in Figure 9, fell by  10.1 
percent. This suggests that about three-quarters of the reduction in farm demand for water during 
this  period was a result of cropping pattern shifts, and only about one-quarter resulted directly from 
increased water application efficiency occasioned by the shift to sprinkler irrigation. At the same 
time, it is likely that the introduction of the center pivot sprinkler was instrumental in permitting 
farmers to make the shift to certain new crops because of their lower water application rates and 
more precise water control. The main water-saving effect of improved application technology thus 
appears to have operated indirectly during this period of rapid change. 
Taking  the analysis  one step further,  aggregate water  supply  at the farm  turnout can  be 
standardized using the PET of the particular crop mix grown in each year. This resulted in an 
indicator termed the net Relative Water Supply (RWS.).  RWSn is seen (Table 5 rp.561) to have 
decreased over the past 30 years, with an average value of 1.46 for the peri0d.2~  This means that, 
on average, the amount of water delivered to the farm turnouts was 1.46  times the weighted average 
crop water requirement. 
26  The amount of water delivered to farm NrnoutS was actually less in 1969 and 1970 than in 1968, the last year of the 
USBR management. 
27  Here and throughout this study, PET,  as reported. is net of effective precipitation.  Because summeninx effective 
precipitation in the  CBP is very small, this modification makes little difference in practice. 
28  Changes  in PET do not reflect changes in climatological demand  since a common set of average crop-specific PET 
demand figures  is used for each year in the series. 
29  Notethat this formulationdoesnot inc1udealeachingreq"irement. Underandconditions. leachingofaaltsisnecessary 
and imponant and  would add somerhing to the denominator ofthe RWS were it considered. Off-season rainfall would 
provide far some of this requirement. The leaching fraction would probably not vary substantially across the basin or 













Source; Water Distribution Repwts for ¶he CBP. US. Bureau of  Reclamation. 
Note: Years shown on  graph are final yean in each %year penod. Figure 10.  Cmp-weighted potential evapotranspiration for the CBP, 1955.89. 
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Table 5. Five-year  average values  for  PET, net supply and net RWS (in  feet),  the CBP, 1955-89 
Source:  PET computed tiom data in James, Erpenbeck, Bassett, and Middleton, lrrigorion requiremenrs for 
Washingronssrimares  and  merhodolopy.  (Pullman: Washington  State University  19891, 6-13. Net 
supply computed from data in Water Distribution Reports for Ihe CBP, US.  Bureau of Reclamation. 
As indicated earlier, to evaluate an indicator and make value judgements about its level, it is 
necessary to have a standard against which to compare it. What then are standards of acceptable 
water adequacy in the CBP? For the individual farmer, the avoidance of water stress would likely 
be aprincipal objective, suggesting that adequacy and timeliness of deliveries are paramount. Since 
the districts are owned and operated by farmers, it is reasonable to assume that the district managers 
generally share this value, though they may have other values as well, such as maximizing power 
revenues or minimizing the district operating costs. This suggests that the districts would have 
implicit RWS,  standards similar to those of  their farmer members. The value placed on meeting 
full crop PET requirements by the USBR personnel prior to the transition to self-management is 
uncertain, though by most accounts the USBR personnel were highly professional and dedicated 
to providing farmers with the irrigation service they requested. 
With respect to water adequacy, a farmer would require an RWS,  of  at least 1.1  I  at his farm 
turnout to meet full PET demand if his application system operated at 90 percent efficiency or 1.25 
if it operated at 80 percent efti~iency.’~  An average RWSn value of around 1.5 would imply that 
the adequacy objective is generally being met, assuming reasonably even distribution of water 
within each district. 
While avoidance of crop water stress is a prime objective, farmers also want to minimize water 
and private pumping costs. This generally means ordering and applying no more water than is 
necessary to meet crop PET. Farmers would therefore be expected to try to bring down the amount 
of water delivered to their farms down as close as possible to the target RWS.  value dictated by 
the design parameters of their water application system. Final period (1985-89) RWSn values of 
1.35 are approaching the range of assumed target or standard levels, suggesting that deliveries to 
farms cannot be reduced too much further unless cropping patterns evolve further toward less 
30  It  is possible that some farmers might try to  operate below the  peak of rhe  production function curve if economic 
optimality was achieved by applying less than the full PET requirement to reduce operating costs.  It is assumed thar. 
because casts of water and energy are relatively low in the CBP and  the costs of miscalculation  are hiEh. this would 
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water-intensive crops. This issue can also be addressed in the context of efficiency of water use, 
and is discussed from this perspective in a subsequent section. 
Timeliness 
Timeliness would be best considered by comparing seasonal PET curves with records of water 
orders and then comparing the water orders with the timing of water deliveries in a two-stage 
process similar to the one described in the case of  adequacy. However, reports from both the 
fanners and the district officials indicate that water orders have almost always been satisfied 
promptly both before and after transfer. Supporting this perception is the result of a recent study 
of a large irrigation district in Arizona, where Palmer, Clemmens, and Dedrick (c 1990) found that 
72 percent of water orders were filled within 24  hours of  the order date. It was felt unlikely, 
therefore,  that the  time-consuming data assembly and analysis effort necessary to assess this 
dimension of performance would yield useful insight into the transfer process in the CBP. 
Equity 
In the absence of information on distribution of water within the districts, equity of distribution 
was assessed in a simple way by creating a series of ratios of the high and low RWS found among 
the districts in each year. Since this ratio is based on RWS, it has already been adjusted for the 
differing areas of the districts and their different cropping patterns. In a sense, it thus represents 
the ratio of  the water supply made available to the best supplied and the worst supplied of the 
districts if they were to have a standard area and cropping pattern. 
The equity index can be computed in two different forms from the available data. The first uses 
the total diversions into each district main canal as the supply, together with the in-field demand 
represented by the weighted average PET. In the second formulation of the index, losses and 
wastage in the conveyance system are netted out, and the numerator is the aggregate delivery at 
the farm turnout while thedenominator is the weighted average PET. The second index is examined 
here, since it is considered to be the most consistent with the operational objectives of both the 
districts and the USBR, which are based on meeting irrigators’ requests for water as measured at 
the farm turnout. 
The average value of the equity index for the 1960 to  1989 period is 1.10, a remarkably low 
value by international standards (Table 6). Although this index says nothing about the distribution 
among farms within a district, it shows that, on average, the best-watered district received only 
about 10 percent more water, relative to its crop needs, than did the district with the lowest RWS. 
The East District and the Quincy District took turns as the “high” district, while the South District, 
at the far end of the distribution system, was consistently the ‘‘low’’ RWS district. 
In developing-counrry irrigation systems, if  is typical for head-end sections to 
obtain three or  four times as much water per unit area as the tail-end sectionr 
resulting in an equity index of  3.0 to 4.0. 
The behavior of this equity index over time is shown in Figure 11. A rising index accompanying 
the expansion of the system in the 1960s indicates increasing interdistrict disparity in water supplied. 
Following the management transfer in 1969, the index remained at peak levels for several years 
before beginning to move downward in  1975. After a  IO-year period of  decrease, indicating 
increasing equity, the ratio rose quickly again to the levels of  the early 1970s. Ir  is clear fhat 
management ojwater allocation and distribution by the districts does nor have a negative effecf  on 
inrerdisrrict equity of water distribution. The districts appear to have managed and coordinated their 
operations in  such a way that  interdivisional  equity improved steadily under their stewardship 58 
Table 6.  Ratio of high and low disfricr  nef relative water supply values  for  fhe  CBP, 1960-1989. 
Source:  Calculated from Water Distribution Reports for the CBP, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Figure 11.  District ratios of high and low net relative wafer  supply, the CBR 196049. 
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during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reason for the rise in  the  index in the late 1980s is 
unknown, but may relate to  physical deterioration within some districts and aconsequent reduction 
in control over deliveries. 
It must be borne in mind that the differences  in RWS  which underlie the equity 
indexarequitesmallandt~t  even the highest equity indexlevelsreachedduring 
the  period are  extremely  low  (indicating  substantial  equity) compared  to 
situations in most developing countries. 
The  interpretation  of  equity  index  values  is somewhat different  in an 
arranged-demand system such as the CBP, than it is in supply-driven systems 
like  those  typically found  in South  and  Southeast Asia.  In the  latter case, 
interunit  equity  is  ofren  established  as an  explicit  operational  goal,  and 
achievement  of  this  goal  can  be considered  as a  direct  measure  of  the 
effectiveness of the irrigation system. Additionally, the equity objective in these 
supply-driven systems would often be framed in terms of water supply per unit 
area, rather than in  terms ofthe supply relative to crop demand, though this is 
not always the case. 
For the CBP, measures of equity can be computed ex post, but they do not serve, in any direct 
sense, as  operational performance guides or indicators, since operational objectives relate to 
satisfying  fanners’ expressed requests for water, which presumably are related  to the water 
requirements of the crops they are growing. It is interesting to note, though, that excellent equity 
of distribution, at least at the district level, appears as a byproduct of  a water allocation plan aimed 
at satisfying farmers’ expressed demands. It must be remembered that variable costs of production 
in the CBP are related to the volume of  water used, both directly through water charges by  the 
districts and indirectly through private pumping costs for operating sprinkler systems. ‘Ihis type 
of cost-linkage mechanism exerts downward pressure on water orders across the system, which 
can lead to high levels of intra-district equity as crop-related water-demand levels are approached. 
HYDROLOGIC EFFICIENCY 
Efficiency is usually defined as a measure of the output of a process divided by the input used in 
the process. “Hydrologic efficiency” refers to the water delivered to a particular point in the system, 
or used in some way by agricultural operations and processes, divided by the water supplied from 
some upstream point. It does not measure quality of irrigation service provided to irrigators, but 
reflects the amount of water lost in the process of providing the service. Moreover, it is only a 
partial measure of irrigation efficiency, since it considers a single input (water) to a process which 
has many inputs (money, personnel, equipment). Nevertbeless, hydrologic efficiency has often 
been taken as the key indicator of  the performance of an irrigation system, and measures of 
hydrologic efficiency often yield very useful insights into system operating characteristics. 
We assess tertiarj unit efliciency, conveyance efliciency, and overall or project efficiency of 
the CBP following the terminology used by Bos and Nugteren (1990). In the absence of system 
deliveries for nonirrigation purposes, we can define tertiary unit efficiency (en)  as PET divided by 
aggregate water deliveries to farm turnouts; conveyance efficiency (e,) as aggregate deliveries to 
farm turnouts divided by the water turned into system main canals; and overall efficiency (ep) as 
PET divided by the quantity of water turned into system main canals (or eu e).  In general, eu is a 
function of the type and condition of technology used on the farm and the quality of an individual RESULTS OF  THE TRANSFER  61 
farmer’s  management. The other component efficiency, Q, is a function of  the management 
exercised by  the irrigation district and the lining and water control technology it employs, as well 
as its state of repair. Both efficiency measures are also dependent on soil characteristics, such as 
infiltration rates and evaporation rates, which are assumed to be constant from year to year. 
Figure 12 showstheoverallefficiency(ep)oftheCBPovera27-yearperiodasaseriesof1-year 
moving averages. Efficiency is defined as system-wide PET divided by the aggregate net supply 
turned into the three district main canals. It is seen that maximum efficiency  levels are achieved 
in  1978, 1982, and 1986, well after the transfer to the district management. Beyond that simple 
observation, however, the figure suggests several distinct periods that bear further scrutiny. These 
are (a) the rising portion hm  1962 until 1968, (b) two sharply falling years, 1969 and 1970, (c) 
a period of rising efficiencies from 1971 until 1978, (d) generally high but variable values from 
1919 to 1986, and (e) a sharp decline in overall efficiency from 1987 to 1989. 
When it is recalled that most of the CBP  was turned over to the irrigation districts to operate in 
January of  1969, the following interpretation emerges. The early sixties was a period of rapid 
system expansion and learning for both the fanners and the USBR managers, resulting in steadily 
improving overall efficiency. When transfer took place in early 1969, efficiency of  operation 
suffered, both  because the districts were new to canal management, and perhaps because less 
prediaable or reliable deliveries also affected fanners’ ability to manage tertiary-level distribution 
and application efficiently. A learning process quickly set in again, however, coupled with physical 
improvements mandated by  the transfer agreements and improved application technology at the 
farm level, resulting in generally improving efficiencies for the next 16 years. 
To explore this interesting scenario further, we have disaggregated overall efficiency, and the 
two component efficiencies are shown in Figure 13 as 3-year moving averages. The figure shows 
that conveyance efficiency increased steadily from 1957 until 1968, rising by about 13 percentage 
points. In 1969, it fell sharply and is clearly responsible for the precipitous fall in overall efficiency 
in the same year. This behavior supports the hypothesis that the decline in overall efficiency is 
related to the transfer, since such a decline would be expected to show up most directly as reduced 
conveyance efficiency. After three years of decline, during which it dropped 5 points from 0.70 to 
0.65, conveyance efficiency again increased for several years, climbing back to about 0.69. During 
thisperiod,it wasonceagainresponsibleforanetriseinoverallefficiency.  From 1975,conveyance 
efficiency for the CBP declined continuously until the end of the period in 1989, ending at about 
0.60.” 
31  Bos  and Nugtenn (1990.33) present data showing average conveyance efficiencies of aboul0.53 for schemes larger 
than 10,oOO ha The sample  is drawn from  non-tie growing irrigation syslems in  a mixture of  developed and 
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Tertiary unit efficiency, on the other hand. also rose smartly from  1957 and then fell before 
beginning a 4-year rise in 1969, the year of the transfer, from 0.65 to about 0.70.32  From 1975,6 
years into thedistrict-management period, until 1986,  steadilyrising tertiary-level efficiency offset 
falling conveyance efficiency, holding overall efficiency generally constant. As tertiary efficiency 
leveled off, however, and conveyance efficiency  continued to  fall, overall efficiency dropped 
sharply for the last 3 years of the period, resulting  in the 3 percentage point decline in overall 
efficiency recorded between 1987 and 1989. 
The evidence  presented above suggests aposr-rransJeracclamationperiod  lasring abour 6  years 
before sysrern conveyance efficiency wlls restored to levels prevailing prior ro  transfer. This was 
the case with a staff largely made up of the same individuals who had operated the scheme before 
1969. If it had been necessary to recruit and train O&M personnel from outside the system, this 
period could, conceivably, have been longer. It should he noted that there is no evidence that the 
adequacy or timeliness of  water deliveries to farmers suffered during this period, or  that interdistrict 
equity deteriorated. It is only the hydrologic efficiency of the canal system operations which was 
obviously affected. 
The long steady slide in conveyance efficiency which has lasted from 1975 until the present 
raises additional questions. First, is this a matter of concern to system managers? If quality of 
irrigation  service to the CBP farmers has  not  suffered, it may  he that reduced  conveyance 
efficiency is a step consciously taken to make system management easier and to reduce field 
staffing requirements, and hence operating costs. Alternatively, it may be that the conveyance 
system is  simply leakier and less  manageable  than  it  was  in the mid-1970s,  as a result of 
inadequate maintenance and deferred replacement work on system canals, linings, and control 
structures. A third possibility  is that system operational rules and procedures have not been 
appropriately adapted to the decline in aggregate crop water demand and the changed nature of 
that demand which has occurred since the early 1970s. In this case, more water in main canal 
systems is simply running to waste. A fourth alternative, related to the third, is that the shift from 
surface to sprinkler irrigation. with its different pattern of  water demands, while saving water at 
the tertiary  level, increases waste and inefficiency at the system level. These questions will be 
explored further in subsequent sections as additional information is presented to illuminate them 
from different angles. 
One interesting and important point relating to system efficiency remains to be developed. It 
will be recalled that the South Dishict obtains the bulk of its water supply from return flows from 
the two upstream districts. The overall efficiency calculations reported above fail to  consider this 
effect and as a result reported,  in  effect, a set of  weighted  average efficiencies for the three 
subcomponents of  the CBP. For the purpose of examining quality of management by the three 
districts, this was appropriate. If overall system efficiency is examined with respect only to virgin 
water inflows from the Columbia River, a somewhat different picture  emerge^,'^ as seen in Figure 
14 where several things are seen. First, overall efficiency, instead of falling in the 45 to 50 percent 
range, is seen to range between 60 and 70  percent, a considerable improvement dependent simply 
32  Bos and Nugteren (1990,SS) repon an  average eu value of0.70 for six sprinkler-based systems. The sample is drawn 
from irrigation systcms in a mixN~  of developed and developing cauntcies. 
33  IgnoredinlhisdiscussionistheexvactionanduseofCBP-derivedwaterbyagraundwaterdistrictwithintheboundaries 
of the Quincy District. The source of ~s  groundwater is dnowledged by both parties and compensatory payments 
are made by groundwater districts to the CBP irrigation districts. However, the  volume of such =use  is oothnown and 
is not considered in the efficiency calculations.  On the  her hand,  natural rainfall-derived inflows to the Potholes 
Rewrvoir m  also not included in the calculations and would offset. to some extent, the gains in overall efficiency 
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on arevised frame of referen~e.3~  Second, there is amore pronounced increase in overall efficie.ncy 
after 1969. amounting to about 5 percentage points. Finally, the sharp drop in efficiency after 1986 
is still present. The story told by  this figure is thus consistent with that presented in Figure 12 
(p.62). In addition, it brings two additional features to light. First, it shows a more pronounced 
improvement  in  overall efficiency  following  management transfer, illustrating  that  dividing 
management responsibility among three independent entities does not necessarily impair efficient 
operation. In fact, quite the contrary seems to be the case here. Second, it represents more fairly 
(and more favorably), the overall efficiency of the system in comparison with other irrigation 
systems and with respect to potential efficiency levels. In an important and cautionary methodo- 
logical teaching, it also illustrates the great sensitivity which measured system performance can 
exhibit in response to changes in boundary definitions. 
FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
Adjusting for Inflation 
In the following financial analyses, three price indices were used to remove nominal increases 
attributable to inflation from project and farm-level costs and returns. All values reported in the 
analysis of revenues and costs are in constant 1989 dollars unless otherwise indicated. 
Value of crop output was adjusted to constant dollars using the index of  prices received by 
farmers, and the farm-level price of water was adjusted by  the index of prices paid by fanners, 
both from the Economic Report of the President (1991). Operation and maintenance (OtM)  costs 
as well as other CBP revenues and expenditures were adjusted using the Producer Price Index 
(PPI) from the same report. The PPI is a generalized index of prices paid by producers of goods 
and services for inputs, calculated for the entire United States. 
The USBR maintains its own deflator series for O&M expenditures, based on changes in per 
acre O&M expenses in a sample of its own projects. The USBR sample excludes projects whose 
total area varied by more than 20 percent from the previous year and whose O&M costs varied 
more than 50 percent from the previous year. Sample projects are allowed to have only minimal 
changes in management, system physical condition. or maintenance standards for that year. 
An index is first calculated for each project and the individual indices are averaged to obtain a 
general index. The cost streams upon which the USBR  index is based are specific to the USBR 
projects and include any real changes in O&M expenditures as well as  inflation-induced changes. 
The four series are shown together in Figure 15. Comparison of them reveals several interesting 
trends. First, the index reflecting prices paid by farmers tracks the PPI closely, making the two 
interchangeable for practical purposes. Second, both  of  these measures leveled off  in  1982, 
reflecting the onset of  a recessionary period in the United States, and remained stagnant for the 
next 5 years. During the same period, the USBR O&M index appears unaffected by medium-term 
trends in the larger economy. Its resolute rise during both inflationary and noninflationary times 
suggests that either the cost structure of the USBR is preprogrammed for a particular level of 
inflation and therefore unresponsive to real outside events, or it is being driven upward by real cost 
increases in O&M expenditure in addition to inflationary ones. Consequently, the USBR index 
34  Kellerealirnales  the ovemll efficiency af irrigation wntcr use along the lower Nile River Bain to be about 70 percent 
when the cxlensive reuse of canal-derived sutface drainage flows  and groundwater is considend. This would place it 
in approximately the same category as the CBP. Figure 15.  Comparative deflators  for irrigation cost series. 1960-89. 
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Reclamation. 
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was felt to be.  insufficiently independent of sampling biases and the impacts of red changes in 
system O&M costs to be  used in deflating CBP O&M e~penditures.3~ 
Revenue 
Total revenues to the districts averaged US$37.15 per acre (US$91.76 per ha), in constant 1989 
dollars, for the 3-year period 1969-1971 immediately following the districts’ takeover of opera- 
tional responsibility. Revenues fell steadily over the next decade, reaching a low of US$25.53 per 
acre (US$63.06 per ha) for the 1979-1981 period. Income then rose again during the eighties, 
reaching US$31.09 per acre (US$76.79 per ha) in  1987-1989 (Figure 16). 
Driving these changes were variations in income from water assessments charged to Basin 
farmers, which make up 70 to 80 percent of total revenue. As seen in Figure 16, total revenue 
closely tracks the water assessment curve during the 1969 to  1989 period, with some divergence 
toward the end of the period.% Data on water assessments are available from 1961 and provide an 
opportunity to compare trends in assessments before- and after-management transfer. From a level 
ofUS$26.16peracrein 1961,theassessmentrosetoUS$29.10in  1968,thefindyearoftheUSBR 
management. Following management transfer to districts, assessments fell steadily, reaching a low 
of US$17.91 in 1981,  before beginning to rise slowly again,  reaching US$ZO.OO per acre in 1989. 
On average, the per acre water assessment fell by 21.9 percent between the pre- and post-I969 
periods. On a per unit water basis, the cost of water fell 15.9 percent, from US$6.77 to US$5.70 
per  acre-foot, a drop which was smaller but still considerable. 
It seems  clear  that  the  management  shifi  triggered  a series  of  reductions in  real  water 
assessment rates and reversed the rising trend which wasprevailing prior to that time. Farmers, 
through their districts, appear to place a higher premium on holding down fee assessments than 
did the USBR. The increasing trend of the early 1980s  may represent arealization that maintenance 
was being underfunded, but this point requires further exploration. Another interesting feature of 
Figure 16 is the expanding divergence between total revenue and water assessment curves after 
1984, suggesting the increased importance of other sources of income to the districts after that 
time. 
35  Note also that prices received by farmen leveled off in 1980 while other indices continued to rise steadily, highlighting 
the costlprice squeeze in which farmers  were caught for almost a decade. 
36  Although most of the water used in the  South Disuict comes fmm  irrigation reblm flows collected in rhe Potholes 
Reservoir. water assessments in all three distiicb are very similar in  magnitude.  implicitly recognizing the mutual 
dependence  of the three districts on  a single some  of water. 69 
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Table 7 shows shares of total revenue derived from different sources. Farm water assessments, 
the major component, declined from 80.6 percent in 1969  to an average of 67.4 percent during the 
last half of the 1980s.  On the other hand, power revenues became appreciable only in 1985,  and 
in the last half of  the decade made up 4.5 percent of total revenue. The category “interest and other 
revenue” also shows an increase during the. last 5-year period, rising to 14.8 percent of the total?’ 
Income from water  service contracts grew steadily throughout the 20-year period of  district 
management, representing system expansion into adjacent lands not formally included in the 
dismct. Beginning from aminusculetwo-tenths ofone  percent in 1969,  theshareofincomederived 
from water service contracts increased to nearly 6 percent of the total income in 1989,  while land 
covered by  water service constructs comprised about 9 percent of the total project service area. 
The growth in these other income sources caused the total income to the districts to climb rapidly 
from 1984 onward, while allowing districts to restrict water assessment increases to relatively 
modest levels. The total real income grew at a compound rate of 4.1 percent during the 1984  to 
1989 period, while water assessments increased only at a rate of  1.9  percent per year. 
Table 7.  Share af  total revenue, 5-year averages, the CBP.  1969-89. 
Source:  Data from CBP  irrigation districts. 
Three  salient conclusions emerge from  this  analysis. First,  districts  were  effective  in 
substantially  reducing  the  absolute level  of irrigation rates afer they assumed management 
control. That they would wish to do this is not surprising, though their effectiveness is notable. 
Second, all districts hove succeeded in diversifying their activities to generate a larger share of 
their revenue  from sources other than their memberfarmers. Each now gets more than one-quarter 
of  its total revenue from nonmember sources. In  addition to new  sources of income, such as 
small-scale hydropower generation, districts have reduced their own water use, and hence revenue 
from excess water sales, and have sold this water to other fanners on the margins of the districts, 
boosting  revenue  from  water  service contracts.  Third,  interest  earnings  have  become  an 
increasingly  important  source  of  income for the  districts,  suggesting prudent financial 
management and the accumulation of reservefunds. 
37  For the pcriod 1983 to 1989 for which more disaggregated data are  available, more than half (55.8963  of the  income in 
this category consists of interest income  on funds held on account and reserve  funds. “b  balance  of the income shown 
comes from groundwater recharge payment from gmumlwater dislricts and transfers from reserve  funds (16.7%), 
payments bytheUSBR forservicespmvidedbythedistricts(I1.7%),miscellancouscoU~tions(9.5%),andequipment 
rental (6.3%). These figures are  averages  over Seven years.  Proportions for individual years fluctuate substantially. RESULTS OFTHE TRANSFER  71 
The generation of  irrigation O&M revenues from secondary sources is also 
often important in developing countries. Irrigation districts in China generate 
incomefromfisheries, tree crop production in reservoir watershed areas and 
sale ofwater to municipalitiesandindustrialconcems(Svendsen  andLiu 1990). 
in Tamil Nadu, India, irrigators’ associations auctionfishing rights to tanks. In 
Indonesia, village-irrigation ojyicials are allocated  land  usufruct rights for 
cornpensarion for  their  services.  In the  Philippines,  the  semiautonomow 
National irrigation Administration obtains revenuesfrom equipment rental and 
interest  on  construction funds not  yet  spent  (Small and  Carruthers 
1991:148-49). However,  the  weak  legal  bases for irrigators’  associations 
existing in many countries may limit their ability to generate secondary sources 
of  revenue. 
COStS 
The cost of  operating the  CBP during the period  1960 to 1989 averaged US$28.43 per acre 
(US70.22 per ha). Counted are financial (not economic) costs which include dishict operating 
expenses and the district payment to the USBR for operating and maintaining reserve works, but 
not subsidies provided through the USBR. Most notable among the latter is the exceptionally low 
rate paid by the districts for lifting water from the FDR Reservoir, relative to commercial rates for 
power. 
Figure 17 shows the behavior of operating costs over time. Immediately following the shift 
from the the USBR to district management, costs are seen to have increased substantially. During 
the period prior to the transfer (1960 to 1968) the average operating cost was US$28.67 per acre, 
while during the 5-year period following transfer (1969 to 1973) it averaged US$32.51 per acre, 
an increase of  about 13 percent. In 1974, it plunged decisively and remained relatively low for the 
next 8 years before showing a rising trend throughout the 1980s. For the entire post-transition 
period (1974 to 1989). the average operating cost was US$27.02  per acre, only slightly below its 
value  under  USBR  management.  It  is reasonable to regard the increase  in operating  costs 
immediately following transfer as temporary and to attribute it to the transition process itself. 
Although the USBR covered many of the costs involved, the districts incurred start-up costs of 
establishing or expanding offices, setting up databases and accounting systems, and the like. 
In general, about three-quarters of the total operating costs (76 percent) are made up of district 
staff and O&M expenses (staff/O&M)?’  Payments to the USBR  for “reserved works” OBM  make 
up another 13  percent. and “ofher”costs amount to 10 percent of the total. The stafvO&M category 
includes staff salaries and benefits, and such items as maintenance on buildings and canals, lateral 
construction and repair, weed control, staff field expenses and equipment expenses. %%Ned 
works” includes payments to the USBR for operation, maintenance and repair of  canals, dams, 
and pumping plants used in common by the districts and power charges for pumping from theFDR 
Reservoir. The “other” category includes contracted construction work, insurance claims, drainage 
claims, unrecovered assessments and charges, and administrative expenses. -4  N 
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Figure 18 shows staff/O&M costs to be remarkably constant over time, if the transition period 
is ignored, with costs before and after transfer being quite similar. This is consistent with the earlier 
observations  that  operational  procedures  changed  little  after  transfer  and  that  most  of  the 
operational staff simply switched employers. Although year to year variations in staff/O&M costs 
can be seen reflected in the total expense graph, the reduced level of total expenditures during the 
late 1970s is explained by the steady reduction in reserved works expenditures shown in Figure 
19. With the exception of the transition period, these expenditures show a long-term decline over 
25 years from about US$S.50 per acre in 1960 to around US$2.00 per acre in 1984. Subsequently, 
there was a near-doubling of the expenditure rate during the late 1980s. The fall in this category 
of  expenses results, in part, from falling per-acre water-supply levels and consequent reduced 
power charges. This trend is mirrored, in more muted fashion, by  “other” expenditures (Figure 
20). 
The general pattern which emerges is of  relatively little permanent change in expenditure 
patterns as a result of the transfer of management to the districts. Staff/O&M and “reserved works” 
expenditures both experienced temporary transition period increases following transfer, following 
which staff/O&M costs settled back to their previous range while “reserved works” assessments 
continued to fall until the mid-1980s. The total O&M expenditures also show this transition spike 
and subsequent fall to values below pre-transfer levels. During the last half of the 1980s, rising 
reserve  works  assessments and  increasing  administrative  and  other  costs  pushed  the  total 
expenditures hack to the level prevailing prior to the transfer. 
An interview with the Quincy District manager indicated that farmers’ top priority is a ‘‘lean’’ 
operation to keep water charges down. Reportedly, the board restricts costs tightly and the district 
is “right on the line” between maintaining the system in adequate operating condition and letting 
it deteriorate. Others interviewed in that district felt the system is being allowed to deteriorate. The 
South District manager feels that his district is “over the line” and is deteriorating gradually. For 
the system as a whole, the figures examined do not reveal an overall decline in the amount spent 
in the critical staff/O&M category, a decline which, if  present, might suggest that short-term 
economies  are being  sought at the expense of  long-term sustainability. However,  as system 
facilities and equipment age, it may be that the expenditures required to hold the system at a 
particular level of operational performance increase. In this case, constant real levels ofexpenditure 
would become increasingly inadequate. 
PROFITABILITY 
Time series data on farm expenditures and production were not available to allow the calculation 
of the annual farm profitability. From a farmer’s perspective, profitability is the ultimate measure 
of the performance of his operation, hut it is a measure obviously influenced by a large number of 
variables besides the quality and cost of irrigation service. The major effect on the profitability of 
the shift to farmer management of the CBP was probably felt through the one-third reduction in 
per acre irrigation assessments which took place following the transfer. For a l6Oacre farm, this 
would amount to an increase in gross margin of around US$I ,600. The more precise water control 
provided by center pivot sprinklers, which facilitated a shift to higher-value crops, probably had 
a greater impact on profitability, but this change was a farm-level decision and largely independent 
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Several existing studies carried out with somewhat different purposes in mind do provide 
interesting  snapshots  of  profitability  in  different  years.  A  study  by  the Washington  State 
Department of Conservation in 1964 compared net annual returns per acre on sample farms on the 
unirrigated wheatland on the East Side with returns in the imgated area of the CBP. The average 
annual net returns on the unirrigated land were US$6.54, in current dollars, compared with a range 
of US$17.60 to US$41.33 per acre on the irrigated farms. Unsurprisingly, irrigated land has been 
substantially more profitable per acre than adjacent unirrigated land. The East Side farmers had 
objected to the introduction of irrigation due to their collective opposition to the accompanying 
farm-size limitations. Because these farmers did retain larger holdings, however, these per acre 
figures do not reflect respective farm income levels for the two groups. 
A 1978-study (Holland and Young) concluded that farm units of 160 acres were economically 
viable and profitable. Using average prices and crop yields for the period  1973 to  1977, the 
profit-maximizing wheat-potato rotation yielded a net annual after tax income of US$29,000, in 
current terms. The less-intensive but more-common rotation of sugar beets, wheat, alfalfa, and 
potatoes, which was considered more consistent with maintaining soil fertility, yielded a much 
lower averagenet annual incomeofUS$10,000. Both levels wereconsidered“adequate”  tosupport 
an average family of two parents and two children. Put into 1989 dollars, these net incomes work 
out to US$31.958  and US$11,020, respectively. If  the 1964 figures for irrigated farms from the 
Department of Conservation study are put on a similar footing, net income in that year spanned a 
range of  US$4,618 to US$l0,845, or  an average of US$7-732. This suggests that net farm incomes 
did rise, in real terms, between 1964 and 1978. 
A final illustrative comparison relates a farmer’s water-cost savings due to the post-transfer 
drop in assessment levels to net farm income. From Figure 16, the change in per acre assessment 
levels between the 1960s and the 1980s is seen to be  about US$10 (in 1989 dollars). This amounts 
to US$] ,600  for a 160-acre farm. Assuming that the real after-tax farm family income in the 1980s 
remained at the 1978 level, savings in water charges would have comprised about 15 percent of 
the farm family’s income. In other words, average farm  income would have been roughly I5 
percent lower had management transfer not occurred. This calculation is crude, but it does suggest 
the order of magnitude of the savings involved, which is substantial. 
As indicated earlier, the gross returns from the CBP farms have increased steadily, in real terms, 
since the project was constructed (Figure 3 [p.24]). Because the behavior of production costs is 
unknown, however, if  is not possible to make judgements on this basis about net income. 
MAINTENANCE 
Under the terms of the management transfer agreement, the USBR is to conduct an 0&M  audit of 
system facilities and operations in each of the disbicts every two years. Such audits generally 
involve two or three days of field inspections by a team of USBR and consulting engineers. 
Table 8 shows the results of six O&M audits conducted after management transfer between 
1973 and 1988. Audits of pumping stations were conducted during alternate years. There were 37 
recommendations made during the six audits, an average of 2.05 recommendations per audit per 
district. Remedial action in response to 13 of these recommendations was not completed prior to 
a subsequent audit. This yields an average of 0.72 uncompleted recommendations per audit per 
district. 
Recommendations  are divided  into three categories by  the  auditors. Category  1 
recommendations are those where urgent remedial maintenance is required. No recommendations 
were made  in  this  category.  Category  2  recommendations  call  for  important  preventive 
maintenance work. This was the most common type of recommendation made to the districts, 78  CHAPTER  5 
constituting 30 of the 31 recommendations. Category 3 recommendations are for less important 
preventive maintenance work. Seven of  the 37 recommendations were in this category. 
Table 8. Results of the USBR OdMaudits in the three districts of the CBP. 
Source:  O&M audits. USBR,  Columbia Basin Project. 
Note:  Category  I: Urgent remedial maintenance required, Category 2  Important preventive maintenance 
needed; Category 3  Less important, preventive maintenance would help improve O&M. 
In later years, audits were not conducted in each distnct during the same year. 
a 
The recommendations covered a variety of types of  work. Some of the more frequently made 
recommendations  called for the repair of  structures and  mechanical devices, painting,  better 
on-farm irrigation management-especially  to prevent silt-laden farm r~n-off,’~  weed control, 
canal  seepage control,  and  improving  drainage  capacity.  Operational  practices  were  rarely 
commented upon. All the districts were commended for the quality of their overall O&M practices. 
The 1986 audit report for theEast District noted that all facilities reviewed were in “good operating 
condition” and that the district was continuing to “look for new ways to improve the operation” 
of the system. The 1990 audit report for the Quincy District commended the district staff for their 
“progressive O&M program” and noted that all structures observed were in good condition. 
The overall view of  operation and maintenance activities carried out by the districts provided 
by theaudits is positive. Thenumber ofrecommendations isrelativelysmal1,given the totalnumber 
of structures and the length of canals across the dishicts. The districts carried out a program of 
preventive maintenance which successfully kept the system from requiring emergency remedial 
maintenance. Still, facilities in at least one of the districts are deteriorating, in the opinion of its 
manager. 
39  This recommendation  WBS more common in tk carlier audits RESULTS OF  THE  TRANSFER  79 
Attitudes toward maintenance appear to have changed somewhat over time, at least in some 
districts. Under its first manager and  board, the South District operated under a “breakdown 
maintenance” philosophy. After 1984, following changes in board membership, more emphasis 
was placed on preventive maintenance. Availability of power revenues as an income source after 
1985 is said to have made the directors more ready to spend for maintenance. That philosophy 
continues. In the words of the present manager, “I would rather tell a group of fanners how I spent 
their money than why I couldn’t deliver water.” 
Such maintenance audits also occur in  developing countries. In one large sysrem 
in the Philippines, the managers of the  four divisions of the scheme jointly tour 
the scheme once a year and a trophy is awarded fo the division which the 
managers agree was the best maintained. Open, maintenance audits are treated 
rather casually, as in parts of India, for example. On the other hnnd, if O&M 
auditing becomes roo  overbearing, it can interjkre with the decision-making 
autonomy needed by irrigators’associahons. Thisappears to have been the case 
in Colombia, South America, where the irrigation agency, HIMAT. conrinues 
to review and approve annual O&M workplans and budgets in systems where 
management transfer has taken place (Vermillion 1993). 
The question of  the drop in  conveyance efficiency beginning  in  1975 remains,  however. 
Attributing such a change to particular causative factors is difficult, because several factors are 
likely to be involved, because the effects of neglect are cumulative, and because time lags exist 
between  neglect  and  deterioration.  The level  of  staff/O&M  funding  is  a  logical  proxy  for 
maintenance adequacy, but as seen in the analysis of costs, it has shown no persistent downward 
trend, and small year-to-year variations would not be expected to show up as fluctuations in 
hydraulic efficiency. The possibility of increasing 0&M  requirements with time remains, however. 
The O&M audits shown in Table 8 offer a proximate variable between O&M expenditures and 
conveyance efficiency. These  audits do show a  higher  level  of  new  and  uncompleted 
recommendations in the period after 1979, most of which were classed as “important preventative 
maintenance needed” which is consistent with the timing of the decline in conveyance efficiency 
shown in Figure 13 Ip.631. This offers limited support to the idea that O&M expenditures ought 
to be increasing if efficiency declines are to be arrested. CHAPTER 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
THIS  CHAPTER FIRST draws together and summarizes the results of the analysis of the impacts of 
the transition to farmer management in the Columbia Basin Project. It organizes the discussion 
into four topics-technology adoption, hydrologic performance, financial performance, and farm 
profitability-and  then  offers  several  general  conclusions.  The chapter  goes  on  to  identify 
conditions believed to have influenced and facilitated the successful transfer. Finally, it suggests 
important lessons for those attempting similar transfers in developing countries. 
IMPACTS OF THE TRANSFER 
Technology Adoption 
There has been substantial technological change in the CBP since the transfer of management in 
1969. Some of this change, such as the widespread shift to center pivot systems, has resulted from 
individual  decisions  of  farmers responding  to prices and returns.  Other change,  such as the 
installation of automatic gauging stations and telemetry systems has been initiated by the districts. 
It seems clear that the transfer to the district management has not hindered the adoption of  new 
technology in the CBP and may have accelerated it. 
Causes and effects of technological change are sometimes complex and indirect. For example, 
the reduction in water demand which accompanied the rapid shift to sprinkler irrigation in the 
1970s was shown to be largely a result of a shift to crops with lower water demand, rather than to 
the adoption  of  more efficient sprinkler systems per  se. However,  it is quite likely that the 
installation of center pivot sprinklers contributed to improved water control which made the shift 
to new, less water-intensive, often higher-value crops possible. And the willingness of farmers to 
invest in expensive new water application technology is itself, in part, a function of their confidence 
in the reliability of water supplies delivered by  the district. Additionally, the district managers 
assert  that  the shift  to  center pivot  irrigation,  though  motivated  by  private  benefitkost 
considerations, has also had implications for main system management, requiring less-frequent 
changes  in  turnout  settings,  but  causing  larger, more-abrupt changes in  demand,  leading to 
increased main system losses. 
Hydrologic Performance 
The quality of irrigation service received by the CBP farmers does not appear to have been affected 
significantly by the change to the district management. The quantity of water delivered did not 
change markedly after 1969 and reductions in water supply in later years can be explained largely 
by reductions in aggregate water demand resulting from changing cropping patterns. Demand-ad- 
justed equity of water distribution among the districts did decline in the 1970s and 1980s following 
transfer, but then improved again and, on average, equity at the district level was about the same 
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before and after the transfer. The CBP operates on an arranged-demand system of allocation, and 
so timeliness of water deliveries must be measured against the timing of orders for water. Farmers 
appear to have been satisfied with the timeliness of  deliveries both before and after the transfer 
and generally rate this aspect of service highly. 
An examination of the hydrologic efficiency of the system reveals some interesting changes. It 
appears that the system’s new managers required a period of 5 or 6 years after the transfer before 
they wereabletooperatetheconveyancesystem asefficiently asdidtheUSBRprior tothetransfer. 
This demonstrates the complex and subtle nature of the control that is required to operate a large 
system like the CBP efficiently. Farmers, for their part. increased tertiary-level efficiency steadily 
from the mid-1970s. Improvement was driven by a shift from surface to sprinkler irrigation across 
much of  the project area. That rise has now stopped and overall tertiary-level efficiency may even 
be declining slightly at present. 
One somewhat puzzling aspect of  system hydrology is the  continuing  15-year decline in 
conveyance efficiency which set in in 1978, accentuated by a strong upward surge in the amount 
of water turned into the districts beginning in 1986. This recent increase is not reflected either in 
the supplies actually delivered to farm turnouts or in any change in the crop-based demand for 
water, both of  which have held constant. Possible explanations for the overall deterioration in 
system conveyance efficiency include, (a) deterioration in the condition of major system canals 
resulting in increased conveyance losses, (b) inability of system managers and the infrastructure 
to adapt fully to changes in water application technology and cropping patterns and calendars, (c) 
increased water orders to the USBR to allow greater power generation by turbines installed in 
system canals, and (d) increased water orders to the USBR to make management easier and reduce 
staff costs. 
Evidence from the maintenance audits conducted by the USBR, supplemented by  statements 
by project managers, lends support to the idea that system facilities are deteriorating. Whether or 
not this has resulted in  increased conveyance losses is not known with certainty  but  this is 
reasonable to assume. 
The second possible explanation is based on statements made by project managers and is also 
a reasonable one. Managers argue that limitations imposed by system design constrain their ability 
to respond  to the fluctuating patterns of water demand generated by  center pivot operation. 
Conversion  to sprinklers may  have been  a contributing factor to the decline in  conveyance 
efficiency; however, the pattern of conversion, with its period of most rapid growth in the early 
1970s and relatively little change since 1980, does not match  well the pattern of  decline in 
conveyance efficiency. Some of the decline of  the 1970s may be attributable to this cause, but 
other factors are obviously at work during the 1980s as conversion to sprinklers and tertiary unit 
efficiency leveled out while conveyance efficiency continued to decline. 
In considering the third scenario, it is noted that power peneration by the districts began only 
in 1985, well after the decline in overall efficiency commenced, and is clearly not responsible for 
the longer-term trend. However, power to pump water into their distribution systems costs the 
districts less than one-twentieth of the gross income they earn from the commercial sale of the 
power they subsequently generate. It would thus be quite rational for them to increase their water 
orders to the USBR to increase revenues from the sale of power while simultaneously holding 
down the water rates assessed district members. The sharp increase in deliveries to the districts 
beyond 1986, coinciding exactly with the onset of power generation, is highly consistent with this 
scenario. Such a move might have the added benefit of making the system easier to manage, 
especially toward the tail, by keeping more water flowing through it. Both the district managers 
and the USBR operations personnel deny strongly that water supply increases have been driven 
by this motive, but the financial benefit to the districts is clear and no convincing alternative 
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Financial Performance 
Upon assuming management responsibility, the districts moved quickly to cut water assessments 
to the district members. On average, real per acre assessments under the district management were 
only 78 percent of their level during the USBR period. At the same time, the districts diversified 
income sources, increasing the share of revenue from hydropower generation and interest on 
deposited funds, partially offsetting lost water-assessment income. Sale of water conserved to 
nonmembers of the district also increased sharply, demonstrating the power of vested water rights. 
financial autonomy, and quasi-volumetric pricing to shift water to more profitable uses within the 
irrigation sector. 
On the average, costs of operating the system do  not exhibit well-defined shifts associated with 
management transfer, and average expenditure levels before andafer 1969 are roughly similar. 
Although it is impossible to know what expenditure patterns would have prevailed had the USBR 
retained operating responsibility, the USBRs agency-wide O&M cost index provides one clue. It 
shows  that the cost of operating the USBR systems increases in an extremely regular way, in 
nominal terms, and is only loosely related to the underlying rate of inflation. Overall, since 1960, 
the USBR’s cost index has grown to a higher level than more general cost indices, suggesting that 
the CBP operating expenses under the USBR  management might have been higher than they 
presently are, ohex things being equal. 
llueequarters of operating expenses are made up of staff and O&M costs, and these have held 
remarkably constant across the transition. Major expenditure components show peaks just after 
transition, reflecting the one-time costs of the transfer. A ten-year decline in total expenditure from 
the 1969 peak is largely atbibutable to falling reserve works costs. During the last decade, total 
costs have risen again to around their long-term average, driven by increases in reserved-works 
expenditures and administrative and other costs. 
Because district O&M costs have not shown a declining trend since trwfer,  it can be assumed 
that maintenance  levels  at the district  level have not  been reduced  appreciably. Changes in 
reserved-works payments to the USBR do not enter the argument, since the observed decline in 
conveyance efficiency occurred within the disaicts’ areas of responsibility. It remains possible 
that, while the district expenditures on O&M have held constant, they should in fact be increasing 
to counter accelerating deterioration  as the system ages. Some support for this hypothesis  is 
provided by  an analysis of maintenance audits, which shows an increasing number of problems 
being flagged in recent years. This would suggest that if O&M expenditures continue to hold 
constant, system deterioration will continue and that more general rehabilitation will be required 
in the future. 
Farm Profitability 
Gross returns to irrigated agriculture have risen steadily intheCBPoverlhepast 30years. Although 
information on net returns is sketchy, there is some indication that real net returns have also risen. 
Warer assessment levels have farlen by about one-third since the districts assumed management 
responsibility. This is very roughly estimated to comprise about 15 percent of the average net farm 
income. 
General Conclusions 
From many angles, the  transfer of management from the  USBR  to irrigation districts in  the 
Columbia Basin Projecr can be considered a  success on a large scale. While the USBR was able 
to back out of its partly unwanted role in 0&M, the districts gained local control over management 
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through the irrigation system, and culminating with the signing of the transfer agreements 30 years 
later. Analysis indicates that the project has not suffered significant negative impacts due  to 
management transfer in the areas of quality of irrigation service to farmers, management effi- 
ciency, agricultural productivity, or farm profitability. At the same time, the real level ofwater 
charges, on both areal and volumetric bases, has fallen substantially. The effect of the transfer on 
the long-term sustainability of the system is less clear, and there is some indicationthat the physical 
system may be experiencing some net deterioration. 
Similar to the situation in many developing countries, the implementation of the 
project was marked by many delays. 
The idea of an irrigation scheme on the Columbia was evaluated repeatedly over a period of 30 
years before construction was finally authorized. After that it was another 20 years before water 
started to flow, and yet another 20 years before lands under the first phase of the project were fully 
utilized. Even today, 60 years after construction began, half of  the originally planned project 
remains unbuilt. 
Still, it is impressive that management of irrigation for more than half a million acres (200,ooO 
ha) can be handled by  three local irrigators’ organizations. Indeed this  is a recurring pattern 
throughout the American West, even on larger scales. The King’s River Irrigators’ Association 
near Fresno, California, for example, successfully services an area more than twice as large as the 
CBP. To conclude this discussion, some of the factors which characterized the context of transfer 
in  the  CBP are identified,  and  areas  which  seem to require particularly  close attention  in 
undertaking such transfers in a developing country context are pointed out. 
ENABLING FACTORS 
Policy Context 
The established  federal government policy  mandating transfer to farmer management  of  all 
irrigation systems constructed by  it gave the transfer an air of  inevitability. It also meant that 
considerable experience with the transfer process had accumulated before transfer was attempted 
in the CBP. Farmers were brought into the picture at the outset through their irrigation districts. 
Their  agreement to participate  in  the project, to undertake partial capital repayment, assume 
eventual management of the project, and to cover the “full” cost of O&M (which in fact is only 
partial) was required. The offer could be refused and was, in fact. refused by  some. The legally 
binding nature of the agreements reached no doubt strengthens the legitimacy of the districts in 
the farmers’ eyes and permits strong sanctions to be applied by the district on its members when 
required. 
Federal policy also requires a continuing USBR presence in the project as a repository for the 
project water right, the legal owner of the system physical facilities, and provider of ultimate 
oversight. This presence is also valued by  the districts as it offers certain sovereign immunities 
and an ongoing relationship with the USBR. The “partnership culture” between the districts and 
the USBR permitted joint problem-solving during the transfer, leading to a mutual decision to 
continue USBR management of jointly  used  reserved works, contracting by  the districts for 
technical  work  to  be  performed  by  the USBR  staff, and  the creation  of  satisfactory 
USBR-to-district personnel transfer arrangements. The relationship is currently being utilized in 
implementing a program of artificial drainage installation within the project and could possibly 
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Federal water resource policy allows cross-subsidization of  irrigation constructwn costs by 
power revenues and this tends to increase the profitability of irrigated agriculture under the USBR 
projects. In addition, by providing power for lifting water at rates which are many times less than 
current market rates, the government continues to subsidize system operating costs. However, 
within this overall context, the irrigation districts are required to operate with balanced budgets. 
Perhaps most importantly. federal  irrigation policy has  remined fairly constant since  its 
inception. Although there have been changes in panicular features from time to time, the basic 
outlines and the principle of system management by financially autonomous irrigation districts 
have remained.  This  consistency provides farmers with the confidence to  make  investment 
decisions and other longer-term commitments which might otherwise Seem excessively risky. It 
also provides the assurance that private investments which they might decide to make will not be 
duplicated or provided to others at no cost at some future date. 
Social Context 
By contrast to the situation in many developing countries, the project area consisted originally of 
a  relatively  homogeneous popularion of  settlers who were well-educated  and commercially 
oriented. There were few landless poor or others with insecure tenure resident in the project area, 
although in the beginning, some landless settlers arrived and were allocated land. Fanners were 
experienced at creating voluntary associations for a variety of  purposes  and  appreciated the 
usefulness  of joint action. Fanners and their districts had considerable legal undpoliticul power 
and secure land and wafer rights. Farmers were able to negotiate as equals with the government 
and obtained numerous favorable concessions for themselves, such as low power and construction 
repayment rates and relaxed limits on  farm sizes. Such concessions ensured that fanning would 
be a relatively stable and profitable enterprise. Initially, fanners employed their considerable 
political clout to influence the USBR decisions through their elected national representatives.  More 
recently, fanners have begun to  rely more heavily on legal action to pursue and promote their 
interests in the public arena. 
Institutional Context 
A number of important institutions undergird the successful assumption and execution of manage- 
ment responsibilities by  the three CBP  irrigation districts. Fundamental is the existence of u 
reliable system for specifying, allocating and recording rights to the use of water. Without this, it 
is unlikely that fanners would have been willing to assume responsibility  for the common irrigation 
facilities and make the requisite corollary private investments in on-fann equipment and facilities. 
The strong legal basis underlying the creution of quasi-municipal irrigation districts also contrib- 
uted to the successful devolution and management by the districts. The relative autonomy of the 
districts allows them flexibility to control costs and todiversify sources ofincome. Therelationship 
between the USBR and the districts rests on  a set of repayment contracts which spell out the duties 
and obligations of each party. The legitimacy and enforceability of these contracts is an important 
feature of transfer. Supporting and enabling all three of these institutions-firm water rights, 
legally constituted quasi-municipal irrigation districts, and contract law-is a relatively impartial 
andaccessible legal system which provides a mechanism for enforcing contracts and adjudicating 
disputes. 
Another area in which underlying institutions are important is that of financial probity. The 
state, which charters the dishicts. requires that regular audits of the district accounts be carried out 
by certified public accountants. This system of mundatory external audits is another important 
element in the institutional environment facilitating the viability of the irrigation districts. 86  CHAFTER 6 
The  USBR 
The US Bureau of  Reclamation has been characterized by  a high degree of competence and 
professionalism both before and after the transfer. The USBR staff receive salaries which provide 
for an adequate standard of living and enjoy job security under the federal civil service system. 
That security was preserved during the transfer process, since most staffwere transferred to new 
positions with the districts, retaining former salary levels and insurance and pension benefits. The 
remaining staff were reassigned elsewhere, accepted early retirement, or were given new roles 
within the USBR. These steps no doubt helped limit opposition on the pan of affected USBR 
employees which might otherwise have been considerable. 
It is noted that the USBR is not financially autonomous, in the sense that its operating expense 
budget is unconnected with the revenue its activity generates, while the three CBP irrigation 
districts do meet this criterion. Financial autonomy of the fanner districts hns been an imponant 
incentive to both manage the system cost-effectively and keep a reservefund for future repair and 
rehabilitation. 
Financial autonomy of the managing enrity has been a key  attribute of effective 
irrigation service providers  in  developing  countries (Small and  Carruthers 
1991; Svendsen, Adriano, andMartin 1990) andappears toplay a critical role 
here as well. 
Irrigation System 
The physical elements and basic operating rules of the imgation system also form a relevant part 
of the transfer context. First, the system has an ample and reliable water supply. Second, allocation 
has been capably handled on  an arranged-demand basis both before and after the transfer. This 
permits considerable flexibility and responsiveness to market conditions by farmers in choosing 
crops and cropping patterns. Third, there are clear points of demarkation of responsibilify and 
control  where transfers of  measured quantities of  water are undertaken according to  widely 
accepted agreemenfs  and rules, including payment rules. Deliveries to districts and to individuals 
are thus treated as contractual obligations and water is regarded as an economic good rather than 
a social entitlement. Fourth, the system has adequate conveyance capacity to deliver required 
amounts of water throughout the system. Fifth, system physical facilities were upgraded as a part 
of the transfer agreements and were received by the districts in good working order. The transfer 
was thus not the disposal of a dilapidated public property, but rather the concessional sale of  a 
valuable and productive asset. Additionally, much of the technical expertise needed to operate the 
system was transferred with it through the hiring of  the USBR staff members by the districts. 
LESSONS FOR TRANSFER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Lessons which can be taken from the CBP experience for use in developing-country settings can 
be grouped into two categories. The first of these comprises policy and institutional issues which 
can affect the success of a transfer program. The second relates to the process of transfer itself. 
Policy and Institutional Issues 
An assessment of the relative effectiveness of  the various policies and conditions supporting the 
successful transfer of management responsibility in the CBP is beyond the scope of  this study. SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS  87 
Moreover, large public irrigation systems occur in a tremendously wide range of situations around 
the world, and even if such an assessment were carried out, the lessons learned could not be 
conveyed directly to new settings. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify from the preceding analysis some policies which appear 
to have been influential in enabling a successful transfer of  management responsibility. Some of 
these factors will be important only in the context of this particular case, or a relatively narrow 
range of cases, while others will have more wide-ranging importance. Listed below are policy 
conditions which are judged to be important and to possess a measure of general applicability. 
They  are  recommended  not  for immediate and  uncritical  implementation but  for careful 
consideration of their relevance for particular situations by planners and managers of management 
transfer programs in developing countries. 
Put in place a clear and cowistentpolicy mandating irrigation management transfer. 
Transfer is a slow and deliberate process, and basic outlines of policy  governing 
transfer  must remain relatively  constant for an extended  period  to elicit  desired 
responses. Where policy on transfer shifts repeatedly, meaningful and sustainable 
change is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, the USBR  experience in general, and 
the CBP experience in particular, demonstrate that where sustained commitment to 
the practice of transferring system management responsibility exists, the process can 
work effectively. 
Do not expectfull cost recovery (capital and operational costs) in the first instance. In 
most cases, such insistence will result in such a drastic upward revision in the farmers’ 
payment obligations for irrigation service that any proposed management transfer 
program will be swamped in a sea of political unrest. Cross-subsidizing irrigation 
service delivery costs with other water-resource-related revenue streams,  such  as 
power generation or aquaculture, is a practicable way of accomplishing this. 
Manah& financial autonomy for the managing entily. This has been shown to be 
effective and critically important in a wide variety of  circumstances in both higher- 
and lower-income countries. Causing the irrigation district or fanners’ organization 
to generate sufficient income to cover its costs in operating the system provides an 
essential set of feedback links needed to make system management accountable to its 
members. It is not necessary that no public subsidies be involved, but only that they 
be specified in such a way that they do  not increase automatically to make up shortfalls 
in revenue from irrigation operations. 
Provide a strong legal basis  for irrigators’ organizations 
Provide a system of  secure and  well-specified long-tern water rights which can be 
assigned to irrigation systems to offer security for investments of time and money. 
Invest to bring physical  facilities up to standard. Experience in a number of countries, 
including the United States, has shown that programs which couple physical upgrading 
with transfer are most likely to succeed 
Create a fair and accessible professional  auditing system and mandate its use  by 
managing organizations. This system can be established in either public or private 
sectors, but should be carefully regulated to ensure its integrity. 88  CHAPTER 6 
Provide new employment or compensation  for  displaced irrigation agency stag Civil 
service employees of  public inigation  agencies often have considerable political 
influence and must not see themselves as losers in the transfer process. They should 
be integrated into the planning for the transfer and compensated for lost employment 
through early retirement inducements or transfers to new positions. 
Process Issues 
The  following issues relate to the processes employed in facilitating management transfer. Some 
of these have policy and institutional implications as well which should not be ignored. Although 
there is a well-developed literature and body of experience with the process of organizing farmers 
into associations (FA0 1985; Uphoff 1986; Korten and Siy 1989; Upboff 1992), less attention has 
been devoted to some of the other factors listed below. 
Involve farmers early on in  the planning for the transfer. Real participation and 
involvement in “agenda setting” among farmers in the transfer process are essential 
for successful assumption of responsibility. 
Empowerfarmers by giving them the role and status to successfully negotiate with the 
public irrigation agency. This is difficult to do, though one new approach worth 
exploring is the vesting of farmers’ groups with water rights, rather than granting them 
to the managing agency. 
Use contructs between irrigator groups and the managing agency to specify roles and 
responsibilities. This can be a very powerful tool as it implies a voluntary relationship 
between equals and creates mutual obligations and rights, i.e., mutual dependencies. 
Develop a locally appropriate water allocation system with volumetric measurement 
and payment at some level. Measurement does not have to be.  at the level of the farm 
turnout, as in the CBP, but can apply to groups of farms and farmers. 
Provide experience with organization and management for farmers and fanner leaders. 
This is a central subject of the farmer organizational literature mentioned above. 
Provide assistance to operating agencies to improve management and human relations 
skills. Technically trained personnel often lack this kind of  expertise which they need 
to work effectively in a decentralized management environment. 
Specify an ongoing role for the operating agency in “partnership culture” with the 
farmer-based organizations assuming management responsibility. Experience  has 
shown that there often remain tasks which a public agency is better equipped to 
perform. Relative comparative advantage should be clearly identified and means for 
continued cooperation worked out. References 
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Outline of  the Conceptual Framework for Evaluating 
Irrigation Performance 
I.  DELINEATING BOUNDARIES ON WHAT IS TO BE EVALUATED 
A.  System 
1.  Irrigation system only 
2. 
3. 
Irrigated agriculture system (including irrigation system) 
Other systems (including irrigated agriculture system) 
B.  Irrigation subsystems (system functions) 
1.  Acquisition 
2.  Distribution 
3.  Application 
C.  Life-cycle processes 
1.  Planning 
2.  Design 
3.  Construction 
4.  Operation 
5.  Maintenance 
6.  Support 
D.  Geographic extent 
1.  Physical basis 
a.  Designarea 
b.  Service area 
c.  Net irrigated area 
2.  Social basis 
i 
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11.  DELINEATING  TYPES  OF  EVALUATION.  CONCEPTS  OF  PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT 
A.  Models of performance 
1.  Goal-oriented 
a.  Goals of society 
b.  Goals of  external constituents 
c.  Goals of internal constituents 
2.  Natural system 
B.  Rationale for assessment 
1.  Operational performance monitoring 
2.  Accountability 
3.  Intervention 
).'. y >' 
C.  Types of performance measures 
1.  Level 
a.  Process 
b.  Output 
c.  Impact 
2.  Scope 
a.  Achievement 
b.  Efficiency 
3.  Relationship to conceptual indicator 
a.  Direct 
b.  Indirect 
D.  Source of performance standards 
1.  Internal 
2.  External 
3.  Relative 
E.  Time dimension of assessment 
1.  Single point in time 
2.  Multiple points in time 
Source:  Small, L. E. and M. Svendsen, Afromework for  assessing irrigation performance, Working  Papers on 
Irrigation Performance I (Washington, DC  IFPRI, 1992). 